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A R T I C L E S
Environmental 
Law. Disrupted.
by Inara Scott, David Takacs, Rebecca 
Bratspies, Vanessa Casado Pérez, Robin Kundis 
Craig, Keith Hirokawa, Blake Hudson, Sarah 
Krakoff, Katrina Fischer Kuh, Jessica Owley, 
Melissa Powers, Shannon Roesler, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, J.B. Ruhl, and Erin Ryan
Summary
The U.S. regulatory environment is changing rapidly, 
at the same time that visible and profound impacts of 
climate change are already being felt throughout the 
world, and enormous, potentially existential threats 
loom in the not-so-distant future. What does it mean 
to think about and practice environmental law in this 
setting? In this latest in a biannual series of postings 
and essays, the authors, members of the Environmen-
tal Law Collaborative (ELC), have taken on the ques-
tion of whether environmental law as we currently 
know it is up to the job of addressing these threats; 
and, if not, what the path forward should be.
In 2017, the U.S. regulatory environment began a period of intense change, even as the world witnessed the escalation of visible and profound impacts from 
climate change. Alongside these events, and with full 
knowledge of the limited time left in which to address 
existential environmental challenges, the authors, as par-
ticipants in the 2018 Environmental Law Collaborative, 
considered whether environmental law as we know it is 
up to the task of meeting these ongoing, escalating, and 
perilous threats.
Each of the following sections considers where envi-
ronmental law should be headed in the next decade or 
more, and how we might get there. These short pieces 
consider whether and how to reframe and reshape—and, 
ultimately, disrupt—the environmental law landscape to 
better address the catastrophic, synergistic, and disruptive 
ecological changes portended by climate change, biodiver-
sity destruction, and social inequality. They consider at a 
deep level what it might be like if we radically and fun-
damentally reoriented our environmental law and policy 
agenda, and ask: is this possible, desirable, or both?
As we are a diverse group of scholars and thinkers, our 
conclusions are by no means uniform, but they share a 
common thread: this is not time for business as usual. The 
system requires significant, potentially disruptive changes, 
some of which may make us profoundly uncomfortable. 
We hope these essays disrupt your thinking in provocative, 
productive ways, and we look forward to opening a dia-
log with you about how we can reframe, reshape, and ulti-
mately disrupt environmental law to meet the challenges 
of our day.
I. Is It Time to Say Goodbye to 
Environmental Law?
This section was authored by Inara Scott, Gomo Family Pro-
fessor and Assistant Dean for Teaching and Learning Excel-
lence, College of Business, Oregon State University.
Besides being a legal scholar, I also write fiction. My first 
published book was a young adult novel, and it was in pub-
lishing that I became familiar with the problem of shelv-
ing. You see, before you can sell your book, you have to 
identify the genre. That designation tells booksellers and 
librarians where to shelve the book; for e-books, it identi-
fies what category to put it in for online searching.
If you can’t label it, they can’t sell it.
Picking a genre determines how the book is marketed 
and who becomes the audience. Genres also carry deeply 
embedded connotations: for example, who do you pic-
ture reading romance novels? Who do you picture writ-
ing them?
Authors’ Note: The Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC) 
comprises a rotating group of law professors who assemble every other 
year to think, discuss, and write on an important and intriguing 
theme in environmental law. The goals of this meeting are both 
scholarly and practical, as ELC participants seek to use their disparate 
areas of scholarly expertise to study trends and important events in 
the law, and ultimately to improve the environmental conditions 
of the world in which we live. The ELC would like to thank the 
Environmental Law Institute for its continued support of these 
efforts, which have resulted in multiple collections of essays and two 
full-length books. We would also like to thank the Drake University 
Law School and Albany Law School for their support of this project.
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The boundaries of genres can make it impossible to 
write and sell certain kinds of stories. Understanding this, 
authors consider where their books will be shelved before 
they write, and modify their story ideas accordingly. Until 
the 1970s, few books were written with teenage protago-
nists because there was no such genre as “young adult”—
the genre of books for young people aged 12-18 was not 
officially created until the 1960s.1
Like fiction authors, lawyers are trained to think about 
law in discrete categories. Interdisciplinary efforts may be 
viewed with skeptical or even disapproving eyes.2 As a pro-
fessor teaching environmental law at a business school, I 
can say from firsthand experience that many do not con-
sider me to be part of the “environmental law” community 
simply because of where I teach.
The Anthropocene—and, more specifically, climate 
change—offer existential challenges to the survival of 
humanity and life on this planet.3 Many instinctively turn 
to environmental law to solve these challenges. Unfortu-
nately, I do not think the challenges we face will be solved 
by items on the environmental law shelf. No, I believe we 
need to start fresh, create a new genre, and leave environ-
mental law firmly in the past.
To explain why, let’s start with what the environ-
mental law shelf currently contains. Most definitions of 
“environmental law” describe statutes and regulations 
that govern how people interact with the natural environ-
ment—the “natural environment” in this context being 
nonhuman species, plants, and natural resources.4 Envi-
ronmental law is also generally understood to include 
pollution control and management of public lands and 
natural resources. The laws most would identify as the 
canon of the environmental law genre (e.g., the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA), the Clean Air Act (CAA), and 
the Clean Water Act (CWA))5 focus on this relatively 
straightforward human-environment formula. These laws 
generally arose out of a perceived environmental crisis, a 
desire to protect the environment from human harm, and 
1. Ashley Strickland, A Brief History of Young Adult Literature, CNN, Apr. 15, 
2015, https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/living/young-adult-fiction-evolu-
tion/index.html.
2. Brian Tamanaha, Why the Interdisciplinary Movement in Legal Academia 
Might Be a Bad Idea (for Most Law Schools), Balkanization, Jan. 16, 2008, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/01/why-interdisciplinary-movement-in-
legal.html.
3. Robert Macfarlane, Generation Anthropocene: How Humans Have Altered 
the Planet for Ever, Guardian, Apr. 1, 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/books/2016/apr/01/generation-anthropocene-altered-planet-for-ever;  
Will Steffen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 
115 PNAS 8252 (2018), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/ear-
ly/2018/08/07/1810141115.full.
4. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Environmental Law, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/En-
vironmental_law (last edited Nov. 27, 2018).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18; 42 U.S.C. §§7401-
7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618; 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. 
FWPCA §§101-607.
a need to ensure environmental resources were available 
for human consumption.
Over time, the popular understanding of environmental 
law, including this human-environment formula, created 
certain expectations for and limitations on the genre:
1. Environmental law addresses interactions between 
humans and the natural environment, and ways to 
limit human actions in order to protect the environ-
ment. Conversely, environmental law does not focus 
on human-to-human interactions or economic 
transactions. Matters having to do with corporate 
law, tax, and business are generally not included. 
It is only recently that energy law—including fossil 
fuel extraction and electric utility regulation—has 
been considered alongside or even linked to envi-
ronmental law.6
2. Environmental laws address narrow targets with nar-
row solutions. For example, the ESA creates a mech-
anism for protecting individual species. It was not 
intended to create a mechanism for considering big-
ger questions (i.e., how do we protect biodiversity?).7
3. Environmental law is furthered by liberal white activ-
ists. Environmental law is not relevant to conserva-
tives, people of color, or people living in urban settings 
who do not like the woods.8
Point number three is perhaps the most dangerous 
aspect of the environmental law shelf. In a time of viru-
lent political division, environmental law, like anything 
associated with climate change, is associated with one per-
spective and one political party.9 Sadly, it is also associated 
with one race and one socioeconomic status, and negatively 
associated with strident activism.10 Overall, the percentage 
6. Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and Envi-
ronmental Law, 31 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 369, 380-83 (2011).
7. Sarah Gold, The Endangered Species Act Won’t Save Animals. It’s Not Designed 
To., Slate, May 13, 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_sci-
ence/science/2017/05/the_endangered_species_act_wasn_t_meant_to_save_
the_animals.html; Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endan-
gered Species Act Doesn’t Work—And What to Do About It, 5 Conservation 
Biology 273, 275 (1991).
8. Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism’s Racist History, New Yorker, Aug. 13, 2015, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/environmentalisms-racist- 
history.
9. Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental 
Issues, Pew Res. Center, Apr. 20, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental- 
issues/.
10. Nicole Smith Dahmen, The Overwhelming Whiteness of U.S. Environmentalism 
Is Hobbling the Fight Against Climate Change, Quartz, Jan. 4, 2017, https://
qz.com/877447/the-overwhelming-whiteness-of-the-us-environmentalist- 
movement-is-hobbling-the-fight-against-climate-change/; Nadia Y. Bashir 
et al., The Ironic Impact of Activists: Negative Stereotypes Reduce Social Change 
Influence, 43 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 614, 624-25 (2013).
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of Americans identifying as environmentalists is down to 
42% (from 78% in 1991).11
So, at this point in history, what the public thinks of 
as environmental law is law that does not address corpo-
rate governance or economic regulation; sees humans as 
separate from and antagonistic to the “natural world”; is 
narrowly focused on singular solutions in a complex world; 
and is not relevant to a diversity of perspectives or identities.
The danger here should be obvious from this list: many 
of the areas that currently fall out of the environmental law 
arena are precisely the ones that are essential to addressing 
the key challenges of the Anthropocene. Lawyers seeking 
to mitigate climate change must embrace corporate law as 
a key part of their toolbox.12 Shareholder primacy and cor-
porate law that fosters short-termism must be countered if 
we are to fight overuse of natural resources and a culture 
of unfettered consumerism.13 Smart infrastructure devel-
opment and management of the electricity sector is essen-
tial to decarbonizing our economy.14 Understanding how 
to rethink the field of economics could create a path for 
sustainable development.15
To be clear, I am not talking about simply rebranding 
the environmental law shelf. Rather, just like the genre 
“young adult” had to be created to allow for the flowering 
of teenage literature, I believe we need to develop a new 
term to describe the legal challenge ahead of us.
I suggest we call this new genre “commons law.”
By using the term “commons,” I hope to draw attention 
to a few issues. First, I recognize that the traditional notion 
of the commons is a resource shared by the public that is 
not privately owned. However, commons law will refer to 
regulation of public and privately owned resources. Why? 
In the Anthropocene, I believe we must confront the real-
ity that the earth is our commons, and whether activity 
takes place on private or publicly owned land, it can have 
significant impacts on all people.
Second, I hope to call up two environmental law stal-
warts that may seem contradictory: Garret Hardin’s “The 
Tragedy of the Commons,” and Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel 
Prize-winning work regarding the governing of the com-
mons.16 Hardin’s work is appropriate, because many would 
say we are living proof of the tragedy that occurs when 
communities share resources and individuals have the 
incentive to overuse and pollute, rather than conserve. 
11. Jeffery M. Jones, Americans’ Identification as “Environmentalists” Down to 
42%, Gallup, Apr. 22, 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/190916/ameri-
cans-identification-environmentalists-down.aspx.
12. Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 Stan. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019), draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3228536.
13. Roger L. Martin, Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem, Harv. Bus. Rev. Oct. 
9, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem.
14. Granger Morgan et al., Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
The U.S. Electric Power Sector and Climate Change Mitigation 
64 (2005), available at https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2005/06/
us-electric-power-sector-and-climate-change-mitigation.pdf.
15. What on Earth Is the Doughnut?, Kate Raworth, https://www.kateraworth.
com/doughnut/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
16. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-48 (1968); 
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Col-
lective Action (1990).
Ostrom’s work is also appropriate, however, because she 
provides a response to Hardin, offering ways to govern 
shared resources that do not end in collapse of the resource 
and do not require privatization.
Commons law must be broad, diverse, and big enough 
to contain seeming contradictions. It must recognize that 
creation of sustainable communities includes economic 
activity and must include, or even focus on, the regulation 
of this economic activity. It must address the governance of 
corporations that control the majority of global resources 
and threaten global ecosystems.17 It must also recognize 
the value in nonhuman species, biodiversity, and the pres-
ervation of spaces that are free from human development.
Commons law must be interdisciplinary and intersec-
tional. It must avoid the trap of zero-sum environmental-
ism by casting a wide net for stakeholders and developing 
new legal tools that consider social justice alongside eco-
system protection.18 To meet the unique challenge of the 
Anthropocene we need to start thinking outside the envi-
ronmental law shelf.
The canon of environmental law deserves a proud 
place in environmental history for its contributions to our 
planet. However, it does not serve us well as a model for the 
Anthropocene. Moving forward, I believe we need to leave 
environmental law to the past and start fresh. Educate new 
lawyers, activists, and community members in a different 
way of thinking, planning, and legislating.
The Anthropocene demands nothing less.
II. Aggressive Solutions to Disrupt 
Biodiversity Loss
This section was authored by David Takacs, Professor of Law, 
University of California Hastings College of the Law.
Biodiversity is disappearing rapidly, portending grave 
results not just for nonhuman species (and the popula-
tions and individuals that constitute them), but also for the 
functioning ecosystems they constitute, and the human 
communities that depend on diverse species and thriving 
ecosystems—that is to say, all of us. It is perhaps the single 
greatest problem our species faces.19 Even though 15% of 
the earth’s land has designated formal protection, about 
one-third of that land “is under intense human pressure,”20 
and only one-fourth of earth’s land surface remains free 
from substantial human impacts.21 Such degradation 
17. Andy Coghlan & Debora MacKenzie, Revealed—The Capitalist Network 
That Runs the World, New Scientist, Oct. 19, 2011, https://www.new-
scientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network- 
that-runs-the-world/.
18. Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ELR 10328 
(Apr. 2017).
19. Global Biodiversity Continues to Decline, According to New Reports From 
IPBES, Int’l Sci. Council, Mar. 23, 2018, https://council.science/current/
news/global-biodiversity-continues-to-decline-according-to-new-reports- 
from-ipbes.
20. Kendall R. Jones et al., One-Third of Global Protected Land Is Under Intense 
Human Pressure, 360 Science 788 (2018).
21. Global Biodiversity Continues to Decline, According to New Reports From 
IPBES, supra note 19.
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harms the well-being of more than three billion people, 
and consumes more than 10% of annual global gross prod-
uct through loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.22 
Only 13.2% of oceans are “wilderness,” and only 4.9% of 
those areas are within protected areas.23
While cultivation (agriculture, ranching, and for-
estry) and direct exploitation remain the gravest harms to 
biodiversity,24 climate change increasingly threatens bio-
diversity as species are unable to adapt to a rapidly and 
chaotically changing world: our current, static methods of 
conserving species become increasingly inadequate if we do 
not preserve or restore habitats that species will need in a 
climate-addled future.25
We have made strides making laws that constrain 
humans from wantonly destroying everything. The need 
for conservation is a customary norm around the world. 
Nearly all nations have acceded to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, and nearly all nations make some 
attempts to preserve their genetic heritage, with laws that 
sustain endangered species and/or protect land important 
to vital ecosystems and the biodiversity they sustain.
But the cataclysm of species annihilation proceeds 
apace. According to the International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature (IUCN), more than 26,000 species are 
threatened with extinction, including 41% of amphibian 
species, 24% of mammal species, and 13% of bird species 
facing grave extinction threats.26 The human population is 
projected to grow to nine billion by 2050 and likely to 11 
billion by 2100,27 while the average person’s buying power 
and consumption will grow by 150%. Our laws to conserve 
are not keeping pace with our drive to destroy.
To stave off a disastrous disruption in human and non-
human survival, law needs to evolve quickly and radically. 
I am not challenging current legal foci on endangered spe-
cies and protected lands, which, at least, concentrate easy-
to-identify entities (I do know what a bald eagle is, but 
might have trouble drawing the parameters of a given eco-
system type), and has meant that some species that would 
otherwise be gone still live alongside us. We can certainly 
exponentially ramp up what we have been doing.28 Nor am 
I advocating one or more of the following legal disruptions 
22. Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment of Land Degradation 
and Restoration, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services, Doc. IPBES/6/L.9/Rev.1 (2018), https://council.
science/cms/2018/03/ipbes-6-l9_en.pdf.
23. Kendall R. Jones et al., The Location and Protection Status of Earth’s Dimin-
ishing Marine Wilderness, 28 Current Biology 2506 (2018).
24. Sean L. Maxwell et al., Biodiversity: The Ravages of Guns, Nets, and Bulldoz-
ers, 536 Nature 143 (2016).
25. Wendy B. Foden et al., Identifying the World’s Most Climate Change Vul-
nerable Species: A Systematic Trait-Based Assessment of All Birds, Amphibians, 
and Corals, PLOS One, June 12, 2013, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0065427.
26. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, Home Page, https://www.iuc-
nredlist.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
27. Damian Carrington, World Population to Hit 11bn in 2100—With 70% 
Chance of Continuous Rise, Guardian, Sept. 18, 2014.
28. Jessica Owley & David Takacs, Flexible Conservation in Uncertain Times, 
in Contemporary Issues in Climate Change Law and Policy: Essays 
Inspired by the IPCC 65 (Robin Kundis Craig & Stephen R. Miller eds., 
Envtl. L. Inst. 2016).
as the ones we ought to choose. But we do have to rethink, 
drastically, our current approaches to living alongside bio-
diversity if we are to have ample biodiversity among which 
to live, and if human civilization is to be sustained in some 
recognizable form.
E.O. Wilson and other prominent conservation biolo-
gists proposed setting aside “half for nature.”29 Protected 
areas do help biodiversity survive. If done smartly30—with 
careful planning to conserve megadiverse areas that human 
communities depend upon for local and global ecosystem 
services—biologists estimate we could steward 85% of 
nonhuman species while sustaining the human communi-
ties that depend upon them.31
This would also require that the law evolve from a 
static conception of species and landscapes—put a fence 
around an area, manage species in forms and places they 
have long been—to a more dynamic form grounded in 
pinpoint adaptive management. We would need to think 
about maintaining evolutionary potential outside of for-
mally protected areas so that species could migrate, and 
develop nimble systems for prioritizing high-level protec-
tion as areas formally protected for species no longer suit 
their needs in a changing climate. Law would need to 
specify performance standards for areas and species of con-
cern (i.e., ecological indicators or benchmarks that must 
be met), and, if not, required pathways to change how we 
are doing what we are doing. Managers would constantly 
be measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying in 
accordance with the standards.32 This would also result in 
greater employment for local people as biodiversity manag-
ers, green jobs rooted in caring for the earth.
Current efforts to conceptualize and operationalize 
“nature’s contributions to people” broaden our notion of 
“ecosystem services.”33 Including harder-to-quantify con-
tributions of biodiversity to our well-being may result in 
being more inclusive in who gets to define what those 
contributions are, and thus what should be preserved. For 
selected areas, law might provide management autonomy 
with transfer of property rights for local guardians with 
a track record of care and stewardship. Law would need 
to be nimble and place-specific about who are the legally 
mandated managers, who monitors that performance stan-
dards are being met, and what are the legal consequences 
for derogation from those standards.
Concerted, focused, effective efforts to stave off biodi-
versity loss will likely be very, very expensive. To afford this, 
particularly in the global South (but even in the North, 
where no country comes close to preserving “half the 
earth,” or are successfully staunching species loss), would 
be to take the legal principle of common but differenti-
29. Half-Earth Project, Home Page, https://www.half-earthproject.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 26, 2018).
30. James E.M. Watson et al., The Performance and Potential of Protected Areas, 
515 Nature 67 (2014).
31. Half-Earth Project, supra note 29.
32. David Takacs, Forest Carbon (REDD+), Repairing International Trust, and 
Reciprocal Contractual Sovereignty, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 653 (2013).
33. Sandra Diaz et al., Assessing Nature’s Contributions to People, 359 Science 
270 (2018).
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ated responsibilities (CBDR) seriously.34 Wealthy countries 
(and individuals) have become wealthy by exploiting lands 
and species of the South (or by exploiting other citizens) 
without proper compensation. The same entities have pol-
luted the global atmospheric commons without paying for 
the externalities of that pollution.
Laws implementing CBDR would alleviate the poverty 
that requires the poor to degrade nonhuman landscapes, 
and to pay for land and species conservation, including 
employment for a cadre of conservation professionals and 
paraprofessionals. All of this could be abetted by negotiat-
ing a new multilateral environmental agreement to replace 
the weak voluntary commitments embedded in the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, or by amending that agree-
ment to put some teeth into it, including requirements to 
implement CBDR aggressively.
Law has begun, increasingly, to ask those who degrade 
the global environment to pay for such degradation. Under 
the aegis of the polluter-pays principle, REDD+ (reduc-
ing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) 
allows greenhouse gas polluters to “offset” their pollution 
by investing in reforestation or avoiding deforestation, 
allowing trees to work their photosynthetic magic by suck-
ing up carbon dioxide (CO2).
35 Biodiversity offsetting takes 
this logic one step further, by asking developers to offset 
damage to targeted species or ecosystems by paying others 
elsewhere to conserve those species.36
Both practices are controversial; but to stave off mass 
extinctions, when done right and on a large, monitored 
scale, market mechanisms could inject many billions of 
dollars into government conservation coffers, particularly 
to incentivize conservation on private lands (where other-
wise conservation would not occur). State-of-the-art col-
laborations between regional planners, social scientists, 
community groups representing disparate interests, clima-
tologists, and conservation biologists could predict where 
species and ecosystems might likely migrate, predict where 
human communities are likely to expand, and prioritize 
migration corridors that will allow natural communities 
to adapt to climate change; market mechanisms can direct 
and prioritize conservation in these areas.
Desperate and wildly ecologically changing times 
require us to rethink all of our notions of what “belongs” 
where. Law could permit and define parameters on aggres-
sive conservation translocation. In a paradigm change 
from traditional static notions of biodiversity conservation, 
we might assist colonization and introduce species to where 
they had historically been, exporting species from places 
where habitat no longer exists or soon will not exist due to 
changing climates or growing human demands.37
34. David Takacs, Forest Carbon Projects and International Law: A Deep Equity 
Legal Analysis, 22 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 521 (2010).
35. Id.
36. David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Offsetting and the Law, 26 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 161 (2018).
37. Philip J. Seddon et al., The Risks of Assisted Colonization, 23 Conservation 
Biology 788 (2009).
These can be reintroductions to where species have been 
and now disappeared, or reinforcement of individuals 
into existing populations of that species. The “rewilding” 
movement focuses on top carnivores whose (re)introduc-
tion revitalizes ecosystem functions and augments species 
diversity.38 Such programs could also consider introduc-
ing species that have not existed in a place; that would be 
“invasive,” but nonetheless might have some chance of ful-
filling ecological roles and adaptation to the onslaught of 
climate change.39
And given that we are already radically altering what 
may exist and where, we might use genetic manipulation or 
“rescue” for endangered species. Taking this one step fur-
ther, we could resuscitate extinct species through genetic 
manipulation.40 So, for example, organizations like Revive 
& Restore seek “de-extinction,” the return of the woolly 
mammoth, passenger pigeon, and heath hen through tissue 
biobanking, intense genetic (re)sequencing, and cloning.41
A different line of thinking suggests that radical conser-
vation interventions—put a fence around half the earth’s 
surface, manipulate the genetic endowment of life—are 
dystopic interventions that totally miss the point that pov-
erty and inequality drive biodiversity loss, and that “put a 
fence around and protect it” conservation leads to human 
dislocations, political upheaval, and general human mis-
ery.42 The only sustainable way to maintain nonhuman 
communities (and thus human communities) is to change 
the paradigmatic drive toward ever-greater economic 
growth that inevitably degrades ecological and human 
capital, and to transfuse wealth from overconsuming rich 
to disenfranchised poor, North to South.
The ultimate sustainable route to biodiversity conserva-
tion is through what I call “deep equity” (i.e., a fundamen-
tal change in what we value and how we operationalize 
those values in law).43 Deeply equitable solutions maximize 
and synergize individual, community, and nonhuman 
health and potential. Such values, as they become deeply 
rooted in societies, would also become deeply rooted in 
those societies’ laws, creating a virtuous circle. One such 
value change might be reflected were we to give various 
different biological (or nonbiological) entities fundamen-
tal rights, reflecting our expanding conception of beings to 
whom we owe ethical obligations, with laws implementing 
those obligations.44 Or, simply, the wealthy need to con-
38. Video: How Wolves Change Rivers (Sustainable Human 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysa5OBhXz-Q.
39. IUCN, Guidelines for Reintroductions and Other Conservation 
Translocations (2013), https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/ 
2013-009.pdf; Maya L. Kapoor, Should We Relocate Species That Can’t Keep 
Up With Climate Change?, Mother Jones, Aug. 26, 2018.
40. Steph Yin, Scientists See Promise in Resurrecting These Rhinos That Are Nearly 
Extinct, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/
science/northern-white-rhinoceros-resurrecting.html.
41. Revive & Restore, Home Page, https://reviverestore.org/ (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018).
42. Bram Büscher et al., Half Earth or Whole Earth? Radical Ideas for Conserva-
tion, and Their Implications, 51 Oryx 407 (2017).
43. Takacs, supra note 34.
44. Jens Benöhr & Patrick J. Lynch, Should Rivers Have Rights? A Growing Movement 
Says It’s About Time, Yale Env’t 360, Aug. 14, 2018, https://e360.yale.edu/
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sume much, much less than current rates, reflecting the 
urgency of our situation.
But law evolves slowly, and we are unlikely to pursue 
many of these in the short term, and in the long term 
it may be too late to preserve large swathes of function-
ing ecosystems or the magnificent creatures that inhabit 
them, or to save our own species that ineluctably depends 
upon these ecosystems. And that is the ultimate disrup-
tion that environmental law has thus far been ill-equipped 
to prevent.
III. Now Is the Moment!
This section was authored by Rebecca Bratspies, Professor of 
Law at the City University of New York School of Law and 
the Founding Director of the Center for Urban Environmen-
tal Reform.
The choreographer George Balanchine is famous for tell-
ing his dancers, “Why are you holding back? What are you 
saving for—for another time? There are no other times. 
There is only now. Right now.”45
While dance and environmental law are generally not 
considered the most closely aligned fields, I have been 
thinking about Balanchine’s words lately as I try to respond 
to the current administration’s approach to climate change, 
and to environmental law more generally.
On October 6, 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a report titled Global 
Warming of 1.5°C.46 This report underscores the vital 
importance of “now” that Balanchine was trying to con-
vey to his dancers. The report emphasized that the world 
is not yet committed to catastrophe—it is still possible to 
keep anthropogenic climate change below 1.5°C of warm-
ing.47 However, there is only a small window of time in 
which we can change our trajectory and limit the damages 
of climate change. Thus, the IPCC unambiguously states 
that the need for immediate action is urgent and that avert-
ing catastrophe will require “rapid and far-reaching transi-
tions” that “are unprecedented in terms of scale.”48 There 
are no other times. There is only now. Right now!
The U.S. national government seems set on preventing 
any such transition. Announcing with great fanfare that 
the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, the Donald Trump Administration is on the wrong 
side of history. Indeed, the government’s own reporting 
underscores just how dangerous that climate denial has 
become. The Fourth National Climate Assessment, qui-
etly released the day after Thanksgiving, painted a clear 
features/should-rivers-have-rights-a-growing-movement-says-its-about- 
time.
45. Margaret Fuhrer, The Best Balanchine Quotes in Honor of Mr. B.’s Birthday, 
DanceSpirit, Jan. 22, 2018, https://www.dancespirit.com/balanchine-
quotes-birthday-2527739325.html.
46. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C (2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/
sr15/.
47. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers A.3 
(2018), https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf.
48. Id. at C.2.
picture of the climate change impacts “already being 
felt in communities across the country.”49 Nevertheless, 
with climate deniers occupying key executive branch 
positions,50 the Administration alternates between bol-
stering the coal industry,51 undoing laws preventing 
methane and hydrofluorocarbon emissions, and reducing 
fuel efficiency standards.52
Indeed, the Trump Administration recently used the 
prediction that disastrous warming was inevitable as a rea-
son to allow increased carbon emissions from vehicles. Not-
ing that the proposed rollback was “projected to result in 
only very minor increases in global CO2 concentrations and 
associated impacts,”53 the Administration rationalized that 
any such restrictions were too small to matter because cli-
mate change is a global issue. This was, of course, precisely 
the argument rejected in Massachusetts v. Environmental 
Protection Agency.54 In that case, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) had argued that because green-
house gas emissions caused widespread harm, there was 
no “realistic possibility . . . that the relief petitioners seek 
would mitigate global climate change and remedy their 
injuries.”55 The U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected this 
contention, noting that “the United States transportation 
sector emits an enormous quality of carbon dioxide”56 and 
that restricting these emissions would be an incremental 
step that might reduce the risk to some extent.57
Yet even as the federal government backslides, large 
portions of the country are forging ahead. All eyes are 
on the cities, states, businesses, and other organs of civil 
society that have pledged to take action on their own. 
The 3,600-member strong We Are Still In58 coalition, for 
example, has taken up the task of achieving the United 
States’ nationally determined contribution to the Paris 
Agreement59 without federal leadership. Hundreds of 
subnational and private actors have submitted pledges to 
reduce their carbon emissions. These commitments put us 
on track to come close to achieving our Paris obligations. 
And technology is rapidly leaving carbon behind. Even 
49. US Global Climate Research Program, Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in 
the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Summary 
Findings 1 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
50. Rebecca Bratspies, The Climate for Human Rights, 72 Miami L. Rev. 308 
(2018) (listing climate deniers in key administration positions).
51. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing 
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 
(proposed Aug. 31, 2018).
52. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement for the Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient 
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and 
Light Trucks (2018).
53. Id. at 8-73.
54. 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007).
55. Id. at 518-21.
56. Id. at 524-25.
57. Id.
58. We Are Still In, Home Page, https://www.wearestillin.com (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018).
59. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Unit-
ed States First NDC Submission, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndc-
staging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20
First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf.
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in the United States, renewables and electric cars are bur-
geoning, prompting the Climate Action Tracker to revise 
the United States’ projected emissions downward despite 
federal intransigence.60 “There are no other times. There is 
only now. Right now!”
Moreover, the rest of the world seems committed to a 
greener future. A Dutch appeals court ordered the Nether-
lands to ratchet up its climate ambitions.61 A host of simi-
lar lawsuits around the globe are pushing other countries 
to do the same.62 These lawsuits are changing the public 
narrative. Together with the IPCC report emphasizing 
that we are not yet committed to 1.5°C, the message is 
being heard: “There are no other times. There is only now. 
Right now!”
Perhaps the greatest signal that we may be experienc-
ing a sea change is the emerging consensus on the human 
right to a healthy environment. On October 25, 2018, the 
United Nations special rapporteur for human rights and 
the environment addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly for the first time.63 While the United States did 
not attend, many other countries did. Costa Rica, Slove-
nia, and Switzerland spoke strongly in favor of officially 
recognizing a human right to a healthy environment. Rus-
sia prefaced its remarks by stating that the Russian Federa-
tion recognized the right to a healthy environment. France 
has proposed its Global Compact for the Environment, 
which it describes as a “common road map for transform-
ing our world.”64
Together, these developments suggest that there is a 
moment open for action. The U.S. mid-term elections gave 
us a hint of how the federal government might move for-
ward. Just weeks after Democrats gained 40 U.S. House of 
Representatives seats, the U.S. Congress got its first bipar-
tisan climate proposal in recent memory. Spearheaded by 
Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), the Energy Innovation and Cli-
mate Dividend Act65 would reduce U.S. carbon emissions 
by 90% by 2015. Given hostility in the U.S. Senate and a 
president who tweets that every periodic cold spell proves 
that global warming is a hoax,66 federal action remains 
60. Climate Action Tracker, USA, https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
usa/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
61. Netherlands/Urgenda Found., Hague Court of Appeal, 9 Oct. 2018, No. 
200.178.245/01, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=EC
LI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610.
62. Urgenda, Global Climate Litigation, https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/
climate-case/global-climate-litigation/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
63. David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environ-
ment, Address at the 73d Session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewsID=23789&LangID=E.
64. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York, The 
Global Pact for the Environment, https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-Global-
Pact-for-the-Environnement (last modified July 17, 2018).
65. Energy Innovation and Climate Dividend Act, 115th Cong, 2d Sess. (Nov. 
28, 2018) https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/energy_innovation_
and_carbon_dividend_act_-_deutch.pdf.
66. Tom Embury-Dennis, Trump Confuses Climate Change With Weather, Prompt-
ing Widespread Despair, The Independent, Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.inde-
pendent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-tweet-global-warming-climate- 
change-thanksgiving-driving-traffic-a8646081.html; see also Dylan Mat-
thews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115 Times. 
Here’s All of Them, Vox, June 1, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and- 
unlikely. Yet regardless of federal action or inaction, we can 
seize the chance, we can remake our world. Now is the 
time to think big, to think beyond the narrowing limits of 
existing environmental law to what a truly sustainable soci-
ety would entail. There are no other times. There is only 
now. Right now!
IV. Liquid Business
This section was authored by Vanessa Casado Pérez, Associate 
Professor of Law and Research Associate Professor of Agricul-
tural Economics, Texas A&M University School of Law.
The aphorism “water is the new oil” is now truer than it 
has ever been. While many use the phrase to suggest that 
water is as scarce and valuable as oil once was, it is also true 
in another sense: speculation in water markets now rivals 
speculation in oil markets. Oddly, however, water scarcity 
has not translated into a higher price for water, as it has done 
in oil. But this anomaly may be on the verge of changing 
as international investors start to enter the business of cli-
mate change.67 From oil tycoons like T. Boone Pickens68 to 
international hedge funds,69 investment in all things water 
is on the rise. And while many deny climate change, the 
market does not. Since climate change is widely expected 
to induce scarcity in water supplies, business investments 
in the water market are increasing rapidly.70
The alarm has gone off. Those who believe markets 
should not commodify water are appalled by the role that 
investment moguls play: all the investments in the water 
business may lead to price increases for water. There is some 
merit in valuing water as a scarce resource so that we do not 
misuse it. The more expensive it is, the shorter our showers 
would be and the more thoughtful the choice of crops and 
irrigation techniques will be.
But using the market to allocate water also gives rise 
to two concerns: the affordability crisis for low-income 
populations, and the inability to capture certain intangible 
values, such as environmental protection, in a single mon-
etary price.71 The first concern is often answered by say-
ing that the amount of water needed to satisfy our basic 
needs is around 1% of the total water used, so we could let 
the market deal with the rest and figure out how to allo-
politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate- 
agreement.
67. McKenzie Funk, Windfall: The Booming Business of Global Warm-
ing (2014). Nonetheless, the very term “water market” is ambiguous. Those 
who criticize water markets often conflate trading of water rights with priva-
tization of water utilities. That is a mistake. It is both too broad, in that it 
encompasses more than trading the water itself, and too narrow, in that 
water investors look beyond water rights and water utilities to things like 
water conservation and wastewater. Vanessa Casado Pérez, The Role of 
Government in Water Markets 15-16 (2017).
68. Sandi Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Col-
laborative Water Management, 8 Nev. L.J. 994, 999 (2008).
69. Abrahm Lustgarten & Propublica, A Free-Market Plan to Save the American West 
From Drought, Atlantic, Mar. 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/03/a-plan-to-save-the-american-west-from-drought/426846/.
70. Zellmer, supra note 68, at 995.
71. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Missing Water Markets: A Cautionary Tale of Govern-
mental Failure, 23 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 157, 164 (2015).
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market broadly understood, beyond the forfeiture provision 
and the approval requirements. It can. Further, water law 
may be able to target the surrounding industries in which 
investors are interested. First, regulators could limit the 
number of shares a single entity could accumulate. One of 
the main fears is a market dominated by big players. While 
antitrust regulations are set up to deal with monopolistic 
practices that harm the consumer, water law can take a 
page from other natural resources markets and avoid con-
centration by limiting the amount of water rights that can 
be accumulated in the same hands. In fisheries’ individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) programs, there are limits on 
the shares of the total allowable catch that a single ITQ 
owner can acquire.76 This should prevent the concentra-
tion of the agricultural industry in a few hands and avoid 
displacing local farmers.
Second, groundwater should be subject to a permit 
system like surface water is.77 Investment companies 
are keen on exploiting lax regulations, and have noticed 
that in many places groundwater may be more readily 
accessible as an investment.78 The separate regulation 
of a unique resource of surface and groundwater denies 
the science and makes both, given their interconnec-
tion, overexploited.
Third, wastewater regulation needs to be properly 
designed. As it stands today, return flow belongs to the 
user who diverted the water. A city may have a water right 
and divert water from the river. The city does not consume 
all of it. It usually treats the wastewater and sends it back 
to the river, where downstream users use it. But if a city 
decided to reuse wastewater before bringing it back to the 
river, it could do so, leaving downstream users without the 
water they have relied on for decades.79 In some states like 
Arizona, cities may be able to not only reuse it in their area, 
but to sell the water as a commodity because cleaned-up 
wastewater is considered a new product. While incentives 
to invest in reuse are paramount, water regulations need 
to better address the effect on downstream users and the 
ecosystem needs.
An adage seems appropriate to close. Mark Twain pur-
portedly said, “Whisky is for drinking and water is for 
fighting.” Water scarcity will certainly cause fights, as there 
will not be enough water for all users. Given the business of 
water in times of climate change, the question that lingers 
is whether small water right holders and the environment 
can put up a fight against these powerful businesses. The 
three water law measures stated in this essay may be able 
to help.
76. Katrina Wyman, Second Generation Property Rights, Nat. Resources J. 
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with the author).
77. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional 
Conjunctive Management, 47 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 275 (2011).
78. Tate Dwinnell, T. Boone Pickens Invests in Water—Should You?, Seeking Alpha, 
Jan. 17, 2007, https://seekingalpha.com/article/24410-t-boone-pickens- 
invests-in-water-should-you.
79. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Inefficient Efficiency: Crying Over Spilled Water, 46 
ELR 11046 (Dec. 2016).
cate the 1% cheaply.72 Environmental regulations, such as 
water quality or minimum instream flows, could address 
the second.
While the answers to these concerns may not be reas-
suring, we should take comfort in the fact that water is 
somewhat speculation-resistant,73 at least compared to oil. 
Unlike oil regulation, the regulation of markets for water 
rights has built-in mechanisms to prevent speculation. 
These constraints in water markets have driven investments 
toward related industries, like water conservation technol-
ogy or reuse.
Water rights can be traded in the western United 
States and in other jurisdictions such as Australia or 
Chile. Trade includes leases and sales of water rights 
that give the buyer the right to use water if it is avail-
able. Generally, the transactions are subject to two lay-
ers of protection. The first is administrative review of the 
transaction. Transactions are not approved if they injure 
third parties or the environment and, thus, are often sub-
ject to the approval of an administrative agency. Water 
rights are defined across several variables, including the 
point of diversion and the type of use. A transaction will 
normally imply a change in either or both of those vari-
ables. A common transaction might be one between an 
agricultural right holder and an urban consumer, because 
the latter often has a higher willingness to pay and a less 
elastic demand curve. In the U.S. West, these types of 
transactions have brought flexibility to water allocation 
systems, where the majority of water rights were allo-
cated when agriculture was the main economic activity 
and large cities and suburban areas with luscious lawns 
had not developed. Those transactions should make the 
farmer realize the opportunity cost of using water.
Another layer of protection, and more relevant for the 
purposes of speculation, is the forfeiture provision included 
in all prior appropriation states and many other jurisdic-
tions. These forfeiture provisions mandate that holders of 
water rights use the water. If they do not use it for a certain 
period, usually around five years, they may lose the water 
right.74 So, unlike with real estate or stocks and bonds, 
where owners can wait for the market to peak and then sell 
their assets, in water markets, owners cannot engage in this 
kind of “wait and see.” That said, if water becomes valuable 
enough, investors may find a way around these rules. One 
company, Water Asset Management, is taking that route—
considering land an accessory. It focuses on water itself but 
to get to it, it buys land and it tries to make use of the land 
to break even.75
The question is whether there is something that water 
law could do to stop big players from dominating the water 
72. Vanessa Casado Pérez, Go With the Flow: Lessons From Water Management 
and Water Markets, in Governing Access to Essential Resources 241 
(Katharina Pistor & Olivier De Schutter eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016). 
See also Buzz Thompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 
17, 38 (2011).
73. Zellmer, supra note 68, at 997-98.
74. Id. at 1005.
75. Lustgarten & Propublica, supra note 69.
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V. Does the President Really Matter to 
U.S. Participation in International 
Environmental Law? A View From the 
Perspective of Oceans Law
This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, James I. 
Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of 
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. This research was made 
possible, in part, through generous support from the Albert 
and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.
How much do presidents really matter to the United States’ 
participation in international environmental law?
Fairly obviously, presidential turnovers in the United 
States are absolutely critical to how the United States 
conducts its international relations. President George W. 
Bush’s pursuit of Middle Eastern terrorists in the wake of 
9/11, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, represents a 
far different engagement with the rest of the world regard-
ing international terrorism than President Barack Obama’s 
reliance on drones and attempts to bring American troops 
back home. In turn, President Obama’s engagement with 
the rest of the world on climate change, including commit-
ting the United States to the Paris Agreement, represents 
a radically different path than the one President Trump 
has thus far chosen to walk with regard to the same issue. 
Indeed, President Trump’s “America First” approach to 
international relations shows every sign of becoming one of 
the most idiosyncratic periods in the United States’ presi-
dentially driven relations with the rest of the world since at 
least the conclusion of World War II.
But how much does any of that matter to the United 
States’ participation in international environmental law?
The issue, of course, is that the U.S. Constitution for-
mulates treaty-making as a two-body problem: the presi-
dent negotiates and signs, while the Senate advises and 
consents.80 Failure of the United States to participate in 
international environmental law can occur at either stage. 
For example, President William Clinton signed81 but Con-
gress refused to ratify82 the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (to which the United States remains, at least for 
now, a Party). Indeed, as of late August 2018, according 
to the U.S. Department of State, presidents have sent 42 
treaties to the Senate that still await the Senate’s advice and 
consent to ratification.83
One of these 42 treaties is the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).84 President Ronald 
80. U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
81. Press Release, Environmental Defense Fund, President Clinton Signs 
Climate Treaty (Nov. 12, 1998), https://www.edf.org/news/president- 
clinton-signs-climate-treaty.
82. Christie Aschwanden, A Lesson From Kyoto’s Failure: Don’t Let Congress Touch a 
Climate Deal, FiveThirtyEight, Dec. 4, 2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/a-lesson-from-kyotos-failure-dont-let-congress-touch-a-climate- 
deal/.
83. U.S. Department of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate, https://www.state.
gov/s/l/treaty/pending/ (last updated Aug. 28, 2018).
84. Id. ¶ 12.
Reagan refused to sign the treaty when it opened for signa-
ture while he was in office, but President Clinton signed it 
on July 29, 1994.85 It has been sitting with the Senate since 
October 7, 199486—that is, through Presidents Clinton, 
Bush II, Obama, and, so far, Trump. Clearly, the identity 
of the chief executive has not mattered much to the United 
States’ failure to ratify.
Perhaps perversely, however, the United States’ non-
ratification and the identity of the chief executive also do 
not seem to have mattered all that much to the treaty’s 
operation—including in U.S. waters. Of the 193 United 
Nations Member States, 168 (including the European 
Union) have ratified this “constitution for the ocean,”87 
which went into effect on November 16, 1994.88 The 
United States follows LOSC’s jurisdictional provisions 
on the grounds that they are customary international law. 
Indeed, after refusing to sign the treaty, President Rea-
gan first proclaimed a 200-nautical-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone for the United States, in March 1983,89 then 
in December 1988 added a 12-nautical-mile territorial 
sea90—both exactly as LOSC allows.
All subsequent presidents have accepted these proclama-
tions. Finishing up, in September 1999, President Clinton 
proclaimed a contiguous zone for the United States out to 
24 nautical miles91—and, again, all subsequent presidents 
have accepted that declaration. In addition, the United 
States ratified the supplemental Agreement for the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating 
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in August 1996, 
and this treaty came into force on December 11, 2001.92
The United States has perhaps been most out of step with 
the rest of the world with regard to rights in the seabed. In 
September 1945, more than a decade before the first law 
of the sea conventions opened for signature in 1958, Presi-
85. See id. (noting the signing date, which is when President Clinton was in 
office, but also noting that the treaty opened for signature in 1982, when 
President Reagan was in office).
86. Id.
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Status of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement Relating to the Imple-
mentation of Part XI of the Convention, and of the Agreement for the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(2018) [hereinafter UNCLOS Status Chart], http://www.un.org/depts/los/
reference_files/status2018.pdf. Tommy T.B. Koh, president of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, described the treaty as “a 
Constitution for the Oceans” in the final meetings of the conference. Tom-
my T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks at the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 6 & 11, 1982), available 
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.
pdf.
88. UNCLOS Status Chart, supra note 87.
89. Proclamation No. 5030: Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States 
of America, 97 Stat. 1557 (1983), available at https://www.boem.gov/
US-Mexico-Presidential-Proclamation-5030/.
90. Proclamation No. 5928: Territorial Sea of the United States, 193 Stat. 
2981 (1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=35297.
91. Proclamation No. 7219: Contiguous Zone of the United States, 113 Stat. 
2138 (1999), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1999-
09-06/pdf/WCPD-1999-09-06-Pg1684.pdf.
92. UNCLOS Status Chart, supra note 87.
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dent Harry Truman proclaimed the United States’ asser-
tion of control over its continental shelf93—a post-World 
War II recognition of the importance of offshore oil and 
gas reserves. The United States’ most prominent objection 
to ratifying LOSC was its treatment of the deep seabed 
(denominated “The Area”) and its minerals as “the com-
mon heritage of mankind.” However, deep seabed mining 
is just now getting underway, and even then, so far, it is 
taking place only on the deeper parts of continental shelves 
controlled by coastal nations (gold and copper deposits off 
the coast of Papua New Guinea94 and iron sands off the 
coast of New Zealand95). As a result, the United States’ 
objection might be regarded as 40 years premature.
Even with respect to the seabed, however, the United 
States is beginning to behave like the rest of the world. 
Specifically, the United States is mapping its extended con-
tinental shelf in the Arctic Ocean in conformance with 
LOSC96—even though our non-ratification of the treaty 
means that we cannot submit a claim to that extended 
shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf.97 Moreover, U.S. companies like Lockheed Martin 
prefer the legal safety of LOSC when pursuing deep sea-
bed mining; indeed, Lockheed Martin formed a United 
Kingdom (U.K.) subsidiary, UK Seabed Resources, so that 
it could receive its mining licenses from the International 
Seabed Authority pursuant to the treaty.98 Such industry 
preferences and the United States’ interest in the Arctic 
might finally induce the Senate to ratify the treaty.
Maybe. The larger point here, however, is that the United 
States’ relationship to LOSC has been more or less the same 
since President Reagan, despite the fact that he did not sign 
the treaty and President Clinton did. Part of the reason, no 
doubt, is that President Dwight Eisenhower signed, and 
the Senate under new-President John Kennedy ratified, the 
four 1958 United Nations conventions on the law of the 
sea,99 which set forth many of the same kinds of obligations 
and rights as the 1982 LOSC. Another part, no doubt, is 
93. Proclamation No. 2667: Policy of the United States With Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 
Fed. Reg. 12305 (Sept. 28, 1945), available at https://www.gc.noaa.gov/
documents/gcil_proc_2667.pdf.
94. Fatima Arkin, Sea Mining Project Off Papua New Guinea Hits Choppy Wa-
ters, Eco-Business, Feb. 19, 2018, https://www.eco-business.com/news/
sea-mining-project-off-papua-new-guinea-hits-choppy-waters/.
95. Kiwis Against Seabed Mining, What Is Seabed Mining?, http://kasm.org.nz/
seabed-mining/what-is-seabed-mining/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
96. Lauren Steenson, Mapping the Extended Continental Shelf in the Arc-
tic, Coast Guard Compass, Nov. 28, 2016, http://coastguard.dodlive.
mil/2016/11/mapping-the-extended-continental-shelf-in-the-arctic/.
97. See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm (updated July 17, 2018).
98. Lockheed Martin, UK Seabed Resources, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/
en-gb/products/uk-seabed-resources.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
99. The four 1958 conventions are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, text and status available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033c69; the Convention on the High 
Sea, text and status available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.
aspx?objid=080000028003327e; the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas, text and status available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033dff; 
and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, text and status available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800338fb.
that the new jurisdictional provisions in LOSC, and many 
other of its provisions, work to the United States’ advan-
tage. But an important part of the reason is that Senate 
procedures and politics—not presidential inclination—has 
been an effective roadblock to ratification,100 underscoring 
the basic constitutional point that the United States’ assent 
and strict adherence to international environmental law is 
only partially a matter of who the president is.
VI. Learning From Local Response to 
Environmental Disruption
This section was authored by Keith Hirokawa, Professor of 
Law, Albany Law School; and Jonathan Rosenbloom, Dwight 
D. Opperman Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake Univer-
sity Law School.
A brief perusal of the history of environmental law illus-
trates the ways law might be employed to suffer through 
a constant state of disruption. In the past, we have largely 
relied on state and federal environmental legislation and 
regulation to accomplish the task, in part because of a fear 
that local governments will “race to the bottom” and take a 
competitive advantage against their more regulation-prone 
neighbors.101 We would suggest that the reliance on state 
and federal regulation, as well as the lack of confidence in 
local governance, has served to undermine sincere dialogue 
on the potential of local government to govern well both 
within and across boundaries.
The present circumstance of climate and ecological dis-
ruption will provide an opportunity to revisit the issue of 
local environmental law. Specifically, climate change will 
require more engagement with local governments because 
of the local stakes involved. Given current and likely future 
disruptions from rising sea levels, heat waves, and storm 
events, local governments will be faced with coastline inse-
curity, vulnerable infrastructure and difficulties in meet-
ing essential human needs, geological instability, uncertain 
ecological changes (such as invasive species), water scarcity, 
and population migration. Such changes will permeate 
social, economic, and environmental expectations in every 
community. Given the role that local governments play in 
responding to challenges to local quality of life and secu-
rity, local governments will inevitably become players.
There are and will be instances where local governments 
manipulate social, economic, and environmental resources 
to protect their own. But there are and will be examples 
that illustrate the contrary. Some local governments forgo 
regulation of extraction and resource development, while 
100. For recent arguments against ratification, see Theodore R. Bromund et al., 
7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Heritage Found., July 4, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/
commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-
sea.
101. We also note that it is due, in part, to lack of resources. Local governments 
are tasked with critical functions such as safety (e.g., police/fire/hospitals), 
education, provision of potable water, and waste removal, but in many cases 
are limited in the funds they can raise to perform such functions.
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others will adopt more comprehensive land use regulations 
that maintain ecosystem services and other quality-of-life 
determinants. But differences in local governance are nei-
ther surprising nor unwarranted—governments illustrate 
legitimacy though responsiveness to local needs, and local 
needs differ across boundaries. More importantly, norms 
and values develop in very local ways, and it would be a 
mistake to disregard value differences, even at minute lev-
els, that occur across borders.
Local is not only a circumstance that is relevant to 
understanding particular governmental actions. Local also 
provides a framework for understanding common con-
cerns such as shared resources, regional circumstances, 
and intergovernmental cooperation. And, in the context of 
disruption, local can play a significant role in at least the 
following four categories: responsiveness, baseline informa-
tion generation, innovation research, and normalization.
A. Local Is Responsive to Change
Environmental disruption is coming and, in fact, is here. 
Law will have to develop new strategies to face the new 
challenges and immediacy will be a factor. Government 
strategies should be designed to launch on short notice. It is 
easier to experiment with new regulations and approaches 
at the local level: first, because the closeness of local gov-
ernment to governed communities demands it; and sec-
ond, because the scale of local governance makes debate, 
passage, and implementation of new approaches easier.
Local governments are acutely responsive to social, eco-
nomic, and environmental change for good reason. Regard-
less of how such disruptions are perceived on a regional, 
state, or federal level, they are felt locally. The invention 
of the elevator and automobile fundamentally altered the 
role and potential of urban areas to provide homes and 
economic opportunities. In turn, such disruptions helped 
shape attention to infrastructure and governmental service 
needs. More recently, local governments have expeditiously 
responded to water shortages by prohibiting water waste, 
restricting specific water uses, and requiring installation 
of efficient water fixtures and grey water use in new con-
struction and building renovations. Similarly, local govern-
ments have controlled stormwater flows by implementing 
measures for permeable pavements, green roofs, and rain-
water harvesting.102
B. Local as a Source of Baseline Information
As a matter of course, local governments gather and assess 
information on local vulnerabilities to disruptions. Local 
governments keep a watchful eye on natural and built 
infrastructure assets, the availability of natural resources, 
housing stocks, access to food and energy, and population 
102. See, e.g., Chatham, Mass., Protective Bylaws §4(B) (2016) (floodplain 
development and permeable driveways); Denver, Colo., Code of Ordi-
nances §§10-300 to 10-308 (2017) (green roofs); San Diego, Cal., Rain 
Harvesting Rebate Program (cash incentives for rain barrel installation).
dynamics. Local governments often require permit appli-
cants to provide critical information on development eleva-
tions, habitat values, and slope stability. Likewise, local 
planning and development review processes have resulted 
in a wealth of information on groundwater budgets, can-
opy cover, and buildable lands.
Other local governments require energy benchmarking 
and audits for larger buildings and governmental opera-
tions.103 The information is commonly used to inform a 
variety of local government decisions such as land use plan-
ning and permitting, budget decisions and infrastructure 
planning, event planning, intergovernmental cooperation, 
and even the exercise of eminent domain. The informa-
tion helps to identify future risks and costs, the potential 
for public interest in particular problems, and the solutions 
that might be relevant.
Local governments are not better at gathering this 
information due to sophistication or funding. Local gov-
ernments are better at it because of their access to a deep 
pool of relevant information and their lens through which 
the information is discerned. The important point here is 
to recognize the critical role of location to the way local 
governance happens. Based on geological, ecological, eco-
nomic, and cultural circumstances, communities adapt to 
the demands of living in a particular place because com-
munities must survive in their own place. This type of 
experienced information is tattooed with the values that 
particular resources have to their beneficiaries and users 
and reflected in local resource decisions.
C. Local as a Laboratory for Innovative Responses
Communities approach particular changes in their own 
ways—some dig in to wait out changes, some take more 
protectionist ideals and seek to maintain the status quo 
through zoning, where others employ more forward-
thinking measures through long-range planning. It 
should not be surprising that different communities often 
understand changing circumstances in ways that appear 
to contradict. But it is also not surprising that a particular 
community’s reaction to new challenges follows more or 
less the same basic premise: although local needs and cir-
cumstances will vary, human needs and quality of life are 
the common driver.
Accordingly, the third observation about the importance 
of local is variation in innovation. The development of tech-
nologies and approaches to construction, infrastructure, 
economic development priorities, education, and housing 
(and others) is designed to resolve the effects of disruption 
and secure a community’s vision against the backdrop of 
change. Importantly, variation in local responses to disrup-
103. See, e.g., Atlanta, Ga., Code of Ordinances §8-2002 (2016) (requir-
ing both energy benchmarking and auditing for certain public and private 
buildings); Denver, Colo., Code of Ordinances §4-53 (2016) (com-
mercial building benchmarking and reporting); Seattle, Wash., Munici-
pal Code §22.920.010 (2010) (requiring building benchmarks and report-
ing); Austin, Tex., Code of Ordinances §6-7-31 (2011) (commercial 
facilities required to calculate annual energy budget).
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tion generates significant information on what works and 
the local circumstances that facilitate stories of success.
Many local governments are experimenting with incen-
tives to promote green building techniques and even 
requiring developments to implement the most sophisti-
cated building materials. While the federal government 
pursues policies that support coal and concrete, local gov-
ernments are pushing forward with promoting technologi-
cally advanced forms of building. Lancaster, California, 
requires that many new buildings meet net-zero standards 
or be outfitted with a solar energy system that can produce 
two watts of power for every square foot of the home.104 
Georgetown, Texas, offers multiple incentives, includ-
ing net metering and rebates, for residents to add renew-
able energy sources to their properties.105 Miami Beach, 
Florida, a city already struggling with climate change, is 
assessing building fees to combat the impacts of rising sea 
levels through innovative projects such as environmental 
restoration projects, monitoring, green infrastructure, and 
stormwater quality improvements.106
D. Local as Normalization
Elevating location in an analysis of environmental gover-
nance does not suggest any particular value as a normative 
matter. There will be few response strategies that will be 
effective in every community, and a “good” strategy may 
be best guided by the notion that it is good if it would work 
here. In the meantime, preemption is a good check on local 
governance, and top-down approaches to land use regula-
tion may offer meaningful constraints on the bad kind of 
intergovernmental and intercommunity competition.
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of location suggests that 
we should not rush to preempt local initiative. In the mean-
time, although local should be recognized for uniqueness, 
the contingencies in the arena of local regulation can serve 
as a gauge for developing norms. Successful strategies can 
be borrowed and adapted to different communities, which 
in turn will generate additional confidence as response 
strategies across the spectrum of ecological, geological, and 
hydrological difference normalize in the common goals 
that drive locational adaptation.
VII. You Cannot Disrupt What Was Never 
Ordered—Land Use Policy in the 
United States
This section was authored by Blake Hudson, A.L. O’Quinn 
Chair in Environmental Studies and Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Houston Law Center.
The theme of the 2018 ELC, “Environmental Law. Dis-
rupted,” effectively captures the way in which federal 
environmental law has been seemingly turned on its head 
104. Lancaster, Cal., Energy Code §15.28.020(c) (2017).
105. Georgetown, Tex., Code of Ordinances §13.04.083(D)(2) (2012).
106. Miami Beach, Fla., Code of Ordinances §133-6(a) (2016).
under the current Administration. It truly feels like a dis-
ruption, as if nearly 50 years of environmental progress is 
not just being halted, but is at risk of being reversed, even 
on issues that in recent decades seemed settled—like hav-
ing safe air to breathe and safe water to drink. Of course, 
we have seen this play out before, such as when President 
Reagan was first elected and began the rollback of federal 
environmental protections. But partisanship is much more 
acute today than it was even then,107 and the disruption 
seems to have an air of permanence about it, or at least an 
air of long-term persistence.
In light of this disruption, many are calling for an 
increased reliance on the next line of defense, state govern-
ments. It is an understandable position, given that some 
states have demonstrated an interest in addressing environ-
mental problems more broadly, as well as the political will 
and administrative capacity to do so. Yet for many more 
states, particularly in regions of the country like the South-
east (where I am from), an understanding of the state’s role 
in protecting citizens from environmental and associated 
economic harm, and development of the political will and 
institutional capacity to carry out such programs, feels quite 
remote. In these locations, it is arguably not much further 
developed than it was when the state of Ohio seemed con-
tent to let the Cuyahoga River burn in the 1960s.
But what about the areas of law where there never was 
a comprehensive, ordered legal approach already in place 
to be disrupted—the legal fronts where states have yet 
to comprehensively exercise their authority to protect the 
environment, and where the federal government has little 
to no regulatory safeguards in place? Such is the case with 
land development that impacts natural resources, and the 
dearth of policies in place to comprehensively and effec-
tively deal with the scope of the problem. In this space, 
there really cannot be a disruption of the legal regime, 
because there never was a meaningful evolution or progres-
sion toward comprehensive environmental safeguards to 
begin with.
Control over the paving of landed natural capital with 
development in the United States remains an uber-decen-
tralized mishmash of policy approaches (at least in places 
where there are any policies actually implemented). Land 
use regulation is the “quintessential state and local power,” 
as articulated by the Supreme Court.108 Thus, the 50 states 
hold the keys to how land development proceeds, with little 
input from the federal government (except in the limited 
circumstances where an endangered species109 or a wetland 
connected to navigable waters110 are present). Most states, 
in turn, often leave decisions over land use development 
to the 88,000 subnational governments that stretch across 
the United States—that is, unless the states do not like the 
107. Carroll Doherty, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Growing Partisan Divide 
Over Political Values, Pew Res. Center, Oct. 5, 2017, http://www.pe-
wresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/05/takeaways-on-americans-growing- 
partisan-divide-over-political-values/.
108. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
109. ESA of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544.
110. 33 U.S.C. §1344(a).
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way in which local governments are trying to control land 
development to prevent environmental harm, in which 
case they can preempt those efforts.111
While the federal government refuses to enter the regu-
latory space, land development impacts many of the targets 
of federal environmental regulation.112 Land development 
affects water quality (the CWA), air quality (mobile emis-
sions under the CAA), and the primary driver of species 
decline, habitat destruction (the ESA). So the subject mat-
ter of federal environmental law could be addressed more 
effectively if state and local governments engaged in better 
land use planning.
Considering the lack of federal involvement, and an ad 
hoc, inconsistent approach to land use planning at the state 
and local levels (with southeastern states being exception-
ally lax regarding land development controls),113 urban 
sprawl proceeds apace, and natural capital is being replaced 
at a profound rate. While some jurisdictions have engaged 
in innovative land use planning and development, and 
gains have been made on some fronts, until society begins 
to view development per se as a complex, “super-wicked” 
environmental problem, we will not maintain a sense of 
urgency along policy fronts to address the problem’s scope. 
We will keep addressing the symptoms of the land develop-
ment problem (endangered species, poor water quality, and 
poor air quality) rather than finding a cure for the disease.
While explication of the minutiae is beyond my scope 
here, I am currently working on a project developing a 
typology of factors that contribute to the wickedness of the 
land development problem (stay tuned). These include the 
challenges of collective action unique to the land devel-
opment sector; corporate design of that sector; legal insti-
tutional hurdles; economic drivers; intersecting federal 
policies; property rights; political economy; time/behav-
ioral science/spatial and geographic factors; population/
demographics; and an ever-changing natural environment 
in a time of climate change. Articulating and exploring 
these factors will be important, both to change the dia-
logue on land development as an environmental problem 
and to more adequately inform policy responses to address 
the problem.
In short, the current state of affairs at the national level 
is a dramatic disruption of environmental progress. But 
we cannot forget the areas where holistic environmental 
progress has never been achieved. In a world of growing 
populations and economic growth tied quite directly114 to 
the replacement of natural capital with human-built capi-
111. See Tom Dart, Denton, Texas, Banned Fracking Last Year—Then the Frack-
ers Fought Back, Guardian, May 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/may/22/denton-texas-banned-fracking-; Andrew Fol-
lett, Louisiana Supreme Court Smacks Down Fracking Ban, Daily Caller, 
June 20, 2016, https://dailycaller.com/2016/06/20/louisiana-supreme- 
court-smacks-down-fracking-ban/.
112. Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental 
Regulatory Reform, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1661 (2016).
113. Blake Hudson, The Natural Capital Crisis in Southern U.S. Cities, 92 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 529 (2017).
114. J. Vernon Henderson et al., Measuring Economic Growth From Outer Space, 
102 Am. Econ. Rev. 992 (2012).
tal (Texas, a state of 25 million people in 2010 is projected 
to double to 50 million citizens by 2050115 due to rapid 
economic expansion), we can no longer take our country’s 
vast expanse of land for granted. We must do better to plan 
and control growth, the development of our land, and the 
replacement of our natural capital. If not, we will eventu-
ally find the loss of those environmental resources quite 
disruptive to human progress and well-being.
VIII. Environmental Justice and 
Environmental Sustainability: 
Beyond Environment and Beyond Law
This section was authored by Sarah Krakoff, Associate Dean 
for Faculty Affairs and Moses Lasky Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School; and Shannon Roesler, Professor 
of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
Since the dawn of the environmental justice movement, 
we have heard the stories of individuals and communities 
left unprotected by our environmental laws and policies. 
Their stories reveal the deep-seated structures of racism 
and inequality that determine what resources and which 
people environmental law will protect.
Despite risks to the cultural and natural resources of 
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the federal government 
allowed the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline.116 
When officials in Flint, Michigan, a majority-minority city 
where 40% of the people live in poverty,117 purported to 
cut costs by switching the city’s water supply, they cut cor-
ners and failed to treat the water to prevent corrosion. Their 
decisions exposed the city’s residents to dangerous levels 
of lead in their drinking water.118 Recent hurricanes have 
again devastated the most vulnerable communities, and 
yet the president dismisses the 2,975 deaths from Hurri-
cane Maria in Puerto Rico as fake news created by Demo-
crats to make him “look as bad as possible.”119
But thousands of people did die. Thousands of people 
were exposed to lead in drinking water. And the promises 
made to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, long ago enshrined 
in treaties, were once again broken. How can the next gen-
eration of environmental laws do better? If the underly-
ing problems include structural racism and inequality, the 
115. Alexa Ura, Report: Texas Population to Double by 2050, Tex. Tribute, 
Mar. 5, 2015, https://www.texastribune.org/2015/03/05/report-texas- 
population-double-2050/.
116. See Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline 
Fight, NPR, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline- 
fight.
117. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Flint City, Michigan, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/flintcitymichigan/PST045217 (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018).
118. See Anna Clark, “Nothing to Worry About. The Water Is Fine”: How Flint 
Poisoned Its People, Guardian, July 3, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/jul/03/nothing-to-worry-about-the-water-is-fine-how-flint-
michigan-poisoned-its-people.
119. See Linda Qiu, Trump’s False Claims Rejecting Puerto Rico’s Death Toll 
From Hurricane Maria, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/09/13/us/politics/trump-fact-check-hurricane.html.
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answer may require radical change. To achieve environ-
mental justice on a sustainable planet, the next generation 
of environmental law will have to change in two ways. It 
will have to go beyond the environment and beyond law.
That is a tall order. But if we are asking big questions, 
there is no point in being coy or timid. There are two huge 
problems facing the planet right now. One is that its stable 
operating systems are at risk of going awry. Climate change, 
species extinction rates, and other indicators lead scientists 
to worry that we are at risk of breaching the earth’s safe 
boundaries for environmental stability.
The second is that inequality between rich and poor has 
increased dramatically over roughly the same period that 
we have put the planet’s operating systems in jeopardy. To 
make matters even more complicated, wealth inequality is 
shot through with the structures of racism and colonial-
ism. So, if we are thinking big, we might as well think 
beyond the parameters of our training and disciplines. We 
should think about what sorts of cultural, economic, and 
legal structures would result in a just, equitable, and sus-
tainable world for humans and nonhumans. And then we 
should try to think and imagine a way from here to there.
Time is of the essence. We need new visions of an equi-
table, sustainable future now. Climate change (which is 
just one of the earth system boundaries at risk) could soon 
result in a virtually unrecognizable and volatile planet. In a 
recent article, Swedish scientist Will Steffen and co-authors 
outlined a scenario that leads the earth to a situation where 
positive feedback mechanisms push “the Earth System 
toward a planetary threshold that, if crossed, could prevent 
stabilization of the climate . . . and cause continued warm-
ing on a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway .  .  . even as human 
emissions are reduced.”120 That pathway is not inevitable, 
but if it is not averted through rapid and steep reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions, “Hothouse Earth is likely to 
be uncontrollable and dangerous to many . . . and it poses 
severe risks for health, economies, political stability (espe-
cially for the most climate vulnerable), and ultimately, the 
habitability of the planet for humans.”121
If the “Hothouse Earth” scenario comes to pass, it 
will occur on a planet marked by dramatic and racialized 
inequality. Economist Thomas Piketty has documented 
the rise in inequality since industrialization, attributing 
it to the fact that capital wealth has grown faster than 
incomes. The upshot is that the United States and other 
western democracies have very little economic mobility, 
and are more similar in this regard to monarchical or feu-
dal societies than functioning democracies. In the United 
States, the long history of legal, political, and economic 
marginalization of African Americans, Native Americans, 
and other non-whites means that today’s inequality is also 
marked by race.
Further, recent research has shown that natural haz-
ards not only have disparate impacts on poor and minor-
ity communities, but that they too contribute to wealth 
120. Steffen et al., supra note 3.
121. Id. at 8256 (emphasis added).
inequality: “Overall, .  .  . natural hazard damages are 
contributing to wealth inequality. Additionally .  .  . 
while inequality is occurring along other lines, the most 
notable inequity is along lines of race, education and 
homeownership.”122 In other words, environmental harms 
not only have disparate economic and racial impacts, they 
also entrench racialized inequality.
In the current cultural and political moment, the struc-
tural causes of environmental degradation, rising inequal-
ity, and racism are converging in troubling ways. Following 
the election of President Obama, a study found that white 
Americans were less likely to view climate change as a seri-
ous problem, suggesting a link between racial resentment 
and climate change denial.123 Moreover, under the Trump 
Administration, U.S. environmental policies have actively 
excluded the most vulnerable communities.
For example, shortly after President Trump assumed 
office, the head of EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice 
resigned in response to the Administration’s proposed 
cuts to environmental justice programs.124 In addition, 
the Administration’s new $1-$7/ton social cost of carbon 
completely ignores the costs of global warming outside the 
United States, an isolationist approach to a quintessentially 
global problem.125 The Trump Administration’s indiffer-
ence to the risks of a warming planet places the nation’s, 
and the world’s, most vulnerable populations at greatest 
risk. It is hardly surprising that a journalist summarized 
the most recent international report on climate change in 
the following way: “Either way, the outlook is dire, espe-
cially for the poor.”126
So, what would laws look like that could take us off of 
the pathway to a deeply unequal “Hothouse Earth” and 
toward a just, equitable, and sustainable planet? They 
would look like anti-poverty laws, wealth redistribution 
laws, public infrastructure laws, and health care laws. 
They would also look like much stronger and more direc-
tive environmental laws with interlinked goals of just and 
equitable decarbonization. And environmental laws would 
engage at all scales of governance, making local issues of 
educational segregation and housing inequality national 
priorities. In short, they would be laws that simultaneously 
ensure a just, equal, and free society, and that protect the 
ecological foundations of the planet.
122. Junia Howell & James R. Elliott, Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of 
Natural Hazards on Wealth Inequality in the United States, Soc. Probs., Aug. 
14, 2018, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/advance-article/doi/10.1093/
socpro/spy016/5074453.
123. Salil D. Benegal, The Spillover of Race and Racial Attitudes Into Public Opin-
ion About Climate Change, 27 Envtl. Pol. 733 (2018), available at https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2018.1457287.
124. See Timothy Cama, EPA’s Environmental Justice Head Resigns, Hill, 
Mar. 9, 2017, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/323209-epas- 
environmental-justice-head-resigns.
125. See Brad Plumer, Trump Put a Low Cost on Carbon Emissions. Here’s Why It 
Matters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/23/
climate/social-cost-carbon.html.
126. John H. Cushman Jr., 1.5 Degrees Warming and the Search for Climate Justice 
for the Poor, InsideClimate News, Jan. 12, 2018, https://insideclimate-
news.org/news/12012018/ipcc-climate-change-1.5-degrees-poverty-envi-
ronmental-justice-draft-report.
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To achieve such laws (and the economic system in which 
they would participate) will likely take the kind of massive 
and diverse activism that resulted in the civil rights and 
environmental law making movements of the 1960s and 
early 1970s. It will take a movement that seeks more than 
legal change. Yet there is plenty for lawyers to do. Without 
lawyers to do the work on the front end, and to be standing 
by during and after the chaos, the chances of getting on the 
right path are greatly diminished. In short, to get on the 
path to a just, equitable, and sustainable earth, it will take 
much more than legal change, but it will require no less 
than the full attention of lawyers committed to defeating 
racism, reversing inequality, and saving the planet.
IX. Malignant Normality
This section was authored by Katrina Fischer Kuh, Haub Dis-
tinguished Professor of Environmental Law, Elisabeth Haub 
School of Law at Pace University.
In the spring of 2018, I joined professionals from a number 
of areas, including law, public health, science, and psychol-
ogy, at the Witnessing Professionals and Climate Change 
Conference at Princeton University, to contemplate the 
impact that the global climate crisis has had on our under-
standing of professional responsibility. In the rich dis-
cussion that ensued, Prof. Robert Jay Lifton, lecturer in 
psychiatry at Columbia University and distinguished pro-
fessor emeritus of psychiatry and psychology at the City 
University of New York, used a phrase—“malignant nor-
mality”—that was referenced throughout the conversation 
and has resonated with me as I have continued to consider 
the intersection between climate change and the profes-
sional responsibilities of attorneys.
In many important respects, norms of legal professional 
conduct—as expressed in the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS) Statement of Good Practices by Law Profes-
sors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Respon-
sibilities and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and 
exemplified by the actions of many attorneys and profes-
sional associations—position the legal profession to provide 
support and leadership in response to climate change. The 
AALS Statement of Good Practices provides that law pro-
fessors have an “enhanced obligation to pursue individual 
and social justice,” and that “engaging in law reform activi-
ties or advocating for improvements in law and the legal 
system is a valued role of legal academics.”127 The Model 
Rules encourage attorneys to participate “in activities for 
improving the law,”128 and allow attorneys when advising 
clients to “refer not only to law but to other considerations 
such as moral, economic, social and political factors that 
may be relevant to the client’s situation.”129 And the Envi-
ronmental Law Institute recently cosponsored the Second 
National Conference of Lawyers Committed to Address-
127. AALS, Handbook: Statement of Good Practices 119 (2018).
128. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct R. 6.1 (2016).
129. Id. R. 2.1.
ing the Climate Emergency, which involved participants 
from across the professional spectrum, including private 
practice, academia, and public interest.
In other ways, however, legal professional norms may 
frustrate an efficacious response by the profession to cli-
mate change. For example, little attention has been paid 
to the role attorneys may have played in the energy indus-
try effort to mislead the public about climate science and 
whether, if at all, the Model Rules speak to that type of 
conduct. Naomi Oreskes and Geoffrey Supran, Inside-
Climate News, and the Union of Concerned Scientists 
have extensively documented how some energy industry 
actors orchestrated a campaign to market lies about cli-
mate science to the public. While the role of attorneys in 
the climate disinformation campaign is not (yet) clear, 
attorneys were deeply involved in the similar campaign 
by tobacco companies to lie to the public about the 
health effects of smoking.130 Indeed, climate disinforma-
tion is but one in a series of revelations about corporate 
public disinformation efforts that now perhaps includes 
the safety of opioids as well.
Yet, while many have recognized that attorneys often 
advise clients regarding public relations, the Model Rules 
provide little clear guidance about the norms that should 
govern attorney conduct in this capacity:
• Model Rule 3.3 (Advocate, Candor Toward the Tri-
bunal) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a 
false statement of fact or law or offering evidence that 
the lawyer knows to be false, but is limited to repre-
sentations to a tribunal.131
• Model Rule 3.6 (Advocate, Trial Publicity) prohibits 
“[a] lawyer who is participating or has participated in 
the investigation or litigation of a matter” from mak-
ing an “extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know will be disseminated by 
means of public communication and will have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adju-
dicative proceeding in the matter,” but is limited to 
lawyers acting directly as spokespeople in the context 
of an adjudicatory proceeding.132
• Model Rule 4.1 (Transactions With Persons Other 
Than Clients—Truthfulness in Statements to Oth-
ers) prohibits lawyers from knowingly making a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person 
and from failing to disclose a material fact to a third 
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting 
a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.133 But various 
requirements embedded in the rule raise uncertainty 
as to whether and how it could apply to counseling 
misleading public communications. It may be diffi-
130. Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the Ciga-
rette Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?, 51 
DePaul L. Rev. 407, 414-18 (2001).
131. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2016).
132. Id. R. 3.6.
133. Id. R. 4.1.
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cult to show that the underlying corporate conduct 
constitutes fraud, as this is indexed to the substan-
tive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction 
and information protected by privilege need not be 
disclosed. Additionally, it is not clear what level of 
knowledge satisfies the requirement for “knowingly,” 
nor is it clear what would be understood to constitute 
a material fact in that context.
• Model Rule 8.4 (Maintaining the Integrity of the 
Profession, Misconduct) provides that it is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion, or to counsel a client to engage in activity that 
would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.134 
This would seem, on its face, to be potentially appli-
cable to attorney involvement in corporate disinfor-
mation campaigns. However, Model Rule 8.4 has 
not been interpreted or applied in a context similar 
to that of counseling corporate public disinforma-
tion. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers cautions courts to “avoid[  ] overbroad 
readings”135 of the model rule, and a review of cases 
and disciplinary proceedings reveals that the rule has 
typically been applied to conduct of a very different 
nature, such as when an attorney helps a client struc-
ture a fraudulent transfer to avoid a known creditor 
or backdates documents.
Can attorneys ethically assist their clients in mislead-
ing the public through corporate disinformation cam-
paigns designed to distort public opinion, like the climate 
disinformation campaign? The answer to that question is 
frustratingly opaque—there is no clear guidance under 
the Model Rules. In two companion articles, profes-
sional responsibility scholar Michele DeStefano Beardslee 
reported on the results of a study documenting the increas-
ing role of attorneys in managing corporate public rela-
tions, and analyzed the Model Rules for guidance regarding 
attorneys functioning in that role.136 She concluded that 
“the current ethics rules, adversarial system, and economic 
incentives almost predestine that attorneys will aid their 
clients in misleading the public about corporate legal con-
troversies,” observing that “[f]or statements that misrepre-
sent or stretch the truth, the current interpretations of the 
Model Rules do little to constrain” attorney advocacy in the 
court of public opinion.137
The lack of clear guidance about the ethical obliga-
tions of attorneys advising clients in the public relations 
context may thus be an aspect of our existing professional, 
normative structure that has contributed to inertia on cli-
134. Id. R. 8.4.
135. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §5 cmt. c (2000).
136. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, In-
stallment One: Broadening the Rule of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 1259 (2009); Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court 
of Public Opinion, Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys 
Go?, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1119 (2010) [hereinafter Beardslee, Install-
ment Two].
137. Beardslee, Installment Two, supra note 136, at 1127, 1145.
mate issues. And there are other climate-relevant aspects of 
legal professional norms that warrant examination. Chief 
among these is the continued greenhouse gas-intensive 
travel to professional conferences that is, perhaps, profligate 
in present circumstances. Critical assessment of these and 
other legal professional norms is warranted to ensure that 
embedded professional norms, practices, and structures do 
not inadvertently contribute to a malignant normality that 
deepens the climate crisis.
X. Disruption as Opportunity
This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Professor, Univer-
sity at Buffalo School of Law.
The world has always been full of disturbances, alterations, 
and disruptions. This has been particularly true when exam-
ining the ecological conditions of the earth. Our planet has 
undergone many changes, even some drastic ones. Yet the 
current rate of environmental disruption is unquestionable 
and unprecedented. Humans are a particularly destructive 
species. We convert species habitat. We pollute rivers. We 
overhunt. Our current historical environmental atrocities, 
however, seem trivial in the context of climate change. We 
are changing our atmosphere, our ocean currents, and our 
ecosystems. Particularly tricky is the unpredictability of 
climate change impacts and intensities.
A. Legal Disruption
Complicating the environmental disruption is an increased 
disruption of the American legal system. In the 1970s, the 
federal government began acknowledging environmental 
harms in our country and created legal strategies to com-
bat them. The goal of the CAA (1970) is to prevent and 
control air pollution. The CWA (1972) seeks to eliminate 
the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters. The 
ESA (1973) recognizes the negative impacts of humans on 
the environment and seeks a “means whereby the ecosys-
tems upon which endangered species . . . depends may be 
conserved.”138 And with the clearest acknowledgement of 
human impacts on the environment, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970) recognizes “the pro-
found impact of man’s activities”139 on the natural world, 
and sets a national policy to “prevent or eliminate damage 
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health 
and welfare of [hu]man[s].”140
While the effectiveness of these laws and the strategies 
Congress adopted is open for debate, the laws represent an 
awareness of environmental harm and a need to combat 
it. All of these statutes and others are now under attack 
from the Trump Administration and the Republican Con-
gress.141 The Administration is seeking repeal and revi-
138. 16 U.S.C. §1531(b).
139. 42 U.S.C. §4331(a), ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
140. Id. §4321.
141. See Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump Is 
Changing Environmental Policy, Nat’l Geographic, originally published 
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sion of the statutes along with changes to regulations and 
agency policies. Beyond the laws on the books, the Admin-
istration is also disrupting federal environmental law by 
dismantling the agencies that carry out those laws.142 The 
number of employees is shrinking along with departmental 
budgets.143 Science posts are being removed or left unfilled 
and scientific reports and language specifically prohibited 
or hidden.144
While the assault on the panoply of existing federal 
environmental programs is disheartening, federal climate 
change policy is truly depressing. In 1992, world leaders 
(along with many others) met in Brazil and acknowledged 
the intense environmental, economic, and social problems 
caused by global climate change.145 Agreeing that the cause 
was “anthropogenic,” President George H.W. Bush signed 
the agreement and applauded the countries of the world 
in taking quick action to combat the serious problem of 
climate change.146
Despite this statement (and the U.S. role in shaping 
both the initial agreement and subsequent accords), the 
federal government has never been a true leader in the fight 
against climate change. However, the Trump Administra-
tion’s actions in this realm are so radical as to again merit 
the label disruptive. Shortly after taking office, President 
Trump announced withdrawal of the United States from 
the Paris Agreement.147 Even more insulting, the only sig-
nificant U.S. delegation at the last Conference of Parties to 
that 1992 treaty preached increased use of fossil fuels.148 As 
Mar. 31, 2017, but continually updated, https://news.nationalgeographic.
com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment/; Nadja Popo-
vich et al., 76 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. 
Times, originally published Oct. 5, 2017, but periodically updated, https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-
rules-reversed.html.
142. See, e.g., Brady Dennis et al., With a Shrinking EPA, Trump Delivers on 
His Promise to Cut Government, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 2018, https://wapo.
st/2CAA1vB?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.be924cb30f7b.
143. See, e.g., Paul Bedard, Success: EPA Set to Reduce Staff 50% in Trump’s First 
Term, Wash. Examiner, Jan. 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/success-epa-set-to-reduce-staff-50-in-trumps-first-term; Jenny Row-
land, National Parks Are the Real Losers in Trump’s Budget and Infrastruc-
ture Proposals, ThinkProgress, Feb. 13, 2018 (describing cuts to staff 
and funding for the National Park Service), https://thinkprogress.org/
national-parks-trump-infrastructure-budget-f0530e5fa7c4/.
144. Coral Davenport, How Much Has “Climate Change” Been Scrubbed From 
Federal Websites? A Lot., N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/01/10/climate/climate-change-trump.html; Jeff Tollefson, 
News Feature, Science Under Siege: Behind the Scenes at Trump’s Troubled 
Environment Agency, 559 Nature 316 (2018); Megan Jula & Rebecca 
Leber, 2017 Was a Big Year for Scrubbing Science From Government Websites. 
Here’s the List., Mother Jones, Dec. 29, 2017, https://www.motherjones. 
com/environment/2017/12/2017-was-a-big-year-for-scrubbing-science- 
from-government-websites-heres-the-list/.
145. United Nations, Earth Summit, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html 
(last revised May 23, 1997).
146. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for sig-
nature June 4, 1992, art. I, ¶ 5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; 
President George Bush, The President’s News Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
(June 13, 1992), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/266798.
147. Timmons Roberts, One Year Since Trump’s Withdrawal From the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement, Brookings, June 1, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/one-year-since-trumps-withdrawal-from- 
the-paris-climate-agreement/.
148. Irene Baños Ruiz, COP23: U.S. Promotes Coal at Bonn Climate Confer-
ence, DW, Nov. 13, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/cop23-us-promotes- 
with the disruption to our environment, the disruption to 
our environmental laws is unprecedented.
B. Disruption as an Opportunity
The real conundrum for environmental activists and 
humans who care about the world is determining what 
to do in the face of this disruption. The paragraphs 
above paint a bleak picture and suggest that disruption 
is doing significant harm. A challenge then is whether 
we can turn that attitude on its head and make these 
disruptions opportunities.
At our 2018 ELC meeting, Vanessa Casado Pérez noted 
that crisis, hitting rock bottom, is what really spurs human 
action on environmental issues. If things are really falling 
apart at the federal government, maybe this disruption 
of environmental law will trigger new energy and action 
from other sectors. Disruptions in innovation are changes 
to technologies that can help sectors (and sometimes even 
societies) leap ahead to a new level. Creative ideas lead to 
new solutions.
One sphere where this environmental and legal disrup-
tion is inspiring action is in the private sector. While the 
business sector can be a force for positive change, there is 
also a strength in individuals acting on their own or join-
ing forces with the power of nongovernmental organiza-
tions. In this light, a turn to the private seems both logical 
and sensible. Citizens seek to fill in the gaps left by a with-
drawn federal government. It is unclear whether they can 
work as effectively toward reducing the harms of ecological 
disruption, but in a time of legal disruption, their efforts 
gain prominence. Three examples highlight this trend:
• Citizen science and information protection. As gov-
ernment agencies began scrubbing their websites of 
environmental information, particularly discussions 
of climate change, others began archiving the infor-
mation and making it available. Private organiza-
tions like the Environmental Data and Governance 
Initiative formed shortly after information began dis-
appearing from public websites.149 Groups that had 
formed earlier for other reasons (like associations of 
librarians)150 also took up the cause of protecting and 
providing information when they saw the need arise. 
Additionally, while EPA may be employing fewer sci-
entists, people across the planet are stepping up and 
collecting data to aid in scientific research and envi-
ronmental monitoring. The rise of the citizen scien-
tist is an innovation that can improve environmental 
information and outcomes if deployed correctly.151
coal-at-bonn-climate-conference/a-41368248.
149. Environmental Data and Governance Initiative, About, https://envirodata-
gov.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
150. See Jeff McMahon, Where to Find Those EPA Web Pages Scrubbed by the 
Trump Administration, Forbes, May 2, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jeffmcmahon/2017/05/02/where-to-find-epa-web-pages-scrubbed-by-
the-trump-administration/#58c691d3bba3.
151. See Special Issue: The Role of Citizen Science in Biological Conservation, 208 
Biological Conservation 1-188 (2017).
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• Increasing support of environmental nongovernmental 
organizations and land trusts. After the election of 
President Trump, donations to environmental advo-
cacy organizations rose. Public attention to environ-
mental issues can be seen in events like the March for 
Science and the Peoples Climate Movement. Gallup’s 
most recent polls show concern for the environment 
growing in the United States, even as fewer people 
identify themselves as environmentalists.152
Land trusts are an interesting part of this trend. 
Like other environmental organizations, they also 
saw their membership numbers and dollars increase 
post-Trump. Their focus differs from traditional 
environmental advocacy organizations as they seek 
to meet their conservation goals through protec-
tion of individual parcels and working with property 
tools. By purchasing land and rights in land, they 
seek to prevent development and conversion of land 
to uses that diminish ecosystem services and ame-
nities. Working with private landowners, they often 
bring new people into the conservation movement. 
Through working with property rights, they create 
restrictions that are more durable than federal regula-
tory mechanisms.
• Citizen suits. Finally, despite a hollowing-out of our 
environmental laws, activists are drawing upon the 
citizen suit provisions contained in many of our key 
environmental statutes. While there have been some 
proposals that would impact some of the fee-shifting 
provisions of citizen suits, neither Congress nor the 
executive branch has suggested repealing citizen suit 
provisions or revising the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which often provides the hook for environmen-
tal litigation. Law firms are preparing for an increase 
in environmental citizen suits and the environmen-
tal activists seem happy to comply. Thus, we can still 
look to our 1970s law for some solace, even though 
we must acknowledge that the standing hurdles for 
environmental citizen suits are nontrivial.
These examples illustrate how energy and innovation by 
private actors can be part of the story of response to the 
current disruption of environmental law. Taken together 
with other examples and proposals in these essays, they can 
provide us with a way forward, if not quite a way out.
XI. Designing Law to Prevent Runaway 
Climate Change
This section was authored by Melissa Powers, Jeffrey Bain 
Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, and Director, Green 
Energy Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School.
152. Gallup, Environment, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018); Frank Newport, New Series: Where Americans 
Stand on the Environment, Energy, Gallup Blog, Mar. 22, 2018, https://
news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/231386/new-series-americans-stand- 
environment-energy.aspx.
“Every system is perfectly designed to get the results it 
gets.”153 If that is so, our climate and energy laws have been 
perfectly designed to fall short. They will not avoid the cat-
astrophic consequences of climate change or enable a swift 
transition to a zero-carbon energy system,154 because they 
have not been designed to achieve those outcomes. Instead, 
climate and energy laws in the United States, including 
those promoted by the most progressive jurisdictions, are 
designed to gradually reduce some emissions and eventu-
ally phase out fossil fuels from some sectors,155 but they are 
not designed to achieve the drastic systemic changes in our 
energy sectors and human behavior that are necessary to 
quickly and permanently reduce greenhouse gases. Even 
laws that may appear to have ambitious final targets—such 
as an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions or 100% 
renewable power by 2050—are designed with loopholes 
and exemptions that make it unlikely that the targets will 
be met.156
For the United States and the world to have a chance of 
preventing runaway climate change, we need to change our 
approach to law making. Rather than focus on incremental 
changes that we hope will meet future targets, we must cre-
ate outcome-oriented climate and energy laws that ensure 
compliance.157 Otherwise, our slim chance to prevent run-
away climate change will be lost.
U.S. environmental law is entering its fifth decade, and 
while the existing legal system has produced significant 
improvements in air and water quality, it is not up to the 
task of addressing climate change.158 This is because U.S. 
environmental law is not end-goal-oriented, and the few 
laws that may seem to establish ambitious goals are not 
designed to meet them. Consider the CWA, which estab-
lishes the goal of restoring and maintaining “the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” so 
that every U.S. water body is fishable and swimmable.159 
However ambitious that goal may seem, the permitting 
systems under the CWA are designed and/or applied to 
allow continued degradation of water bodies, including 
153. This observation is attributed to Dr. Paul B. Batalden. Susan Carr, 
A Quotation With a Life of Its Own, Patient Safety & Qual-
ity Healthcare, July 1, 2008, https://www.psqh.com/analysis/editor-s- 
notebook-a-quotation-with-a-life-of-its-own/.
154. IPCC, supra note 47.
155. Few Countries Are Pricing Carbon High Enough to Meet Climate Targets, 
OECD, Sept. 18, 2018, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/few-coun-
tries-are-pricing-carbon-high-enough-to-meet-climate-targets.htm; Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Effec-
tive Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions Through Taxes 
and Emissions Trading (2018).
156. See Carbon Tax or Cap-and-Trade?, David Suzuki Found., Oct. 5, 2017 
(noting the uncertain emission reductions under carbon taxes and the op-
portunity for loopholes to be engineered into the complex regulations of 
cap-and-trade programs as well as carbon taxes), https://davidsuzuki.org/
what-you-can-do/carbon-tax-cap-trade.
157. Accord Isabella Lövin, To Lead on Climate, Countries Must Commit to 
Zero Emissions, Guardian, Apr. 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2018/apr/17/to-lead-on-climate-countries-must-commit-to- 
zero-emissions.
158. Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental 
Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 Envtl. L. 1, 6-23 (2017) (dis-
cussing the history, achievements, and shortcomings of current U.S. envi-
ronmental law).
159. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387.
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those that are neither swimmable nor fishable due to his-
torical and ongoing pollution and habitat destruction.
The CAA’s goal of “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the 
public health and welfare and the productive capacity of 
its population,”160 is similarly too vague to be considered 
outcome-oriented. In addition, implementation of the 
CAA focuses on balancing the economic interests of pol-
luters with the public’s interest in pollution reduction.161 At 
best, this balance will produce deep emissions reductions 
where cost-benefit analyses support them, but the balance 
is subject to distortion—as the Trump Administration’s 
ongoing efforts to dismantle Obama-era environmental 
regulations reveal.
Even the Acid Rain Program under the CAA, which 
sets a final aggregate cap on sulfur dioxide emissions, uses 
a final target that was set based on politics, not environ-
mental needs.162 U.S. environmental law seeks to slow the 
pace of degradation or to gradually accelerate the rate of 
improvement. While it is important that these laws are 
applied to greenhouse gases until we have better laws in 
place, it is also essential to recognize that existing environ-
mental law will not, in and of itself, do the job of prevent-
ing runaway climate change.
Nor will state and local efforts, as currently designed, 
do the job. In response to the Trump Administration’s 
announcement that it will withdraw from the Paris Agree-
ment, and in response to the Trump Administration’s 
assault on dozens of U.S. environmental rules,163 states 
and local governments have declared their intent to take a 
leading role in mitigating climate change.164 Their actions, 
while both commendable and necessary, are generally not 
designed to achieve decarbonization as an end goal.
Leading states like California and New York have 
enacted scores of laws to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,165 
but neither state has committed to energy decarbonization. 
California recently adopted a target of obtaining 100% 
zero-carbon electricity by 2045,166 but the state does not 
160. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q.
161. See, e.g., Michigan v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 
(2015) (holding that EPA must consider costs borne by power plants when 
deciding whether to regulate power plants under the CAA).
162. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Re-
search, Working Paper No. 2012-012, The SO2 Allowance Trading 
System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment (2012), 
available at http://ceepr.mit.edu/files/papers/2012-012.pdf.
163. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 Daily 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 373 (June 1, 2017); Harvard Environmental Law Pro-
gram, Regulatory Rollback Tracker, http://environment.law.harvard.edu/
policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
164. Sarah Holder, One Year After Trump Left the Paris Agreement, Who’s Still In?, 
CityLab, June 1, 2018, https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/06/
one-year-after-trump-left-the-paris-agreement-whos-still-in/561674/.
165. See, e.g., California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 
ch. 488; Act of Sept. 16, 2009, 2009 N.Y. Laws ch. 433 (establishing a state 
energy planning board to address, in part, greenhouse gas emissions).
166. 100% Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, ch. 312, 2017/2018 Cong. 
(Cal. 2018); David Roberts, California Just Adopted Its Boldest Energy 
Target Yet: 100% Clean Electricity, Vox, Sept. 10, 2018, https://www. 
vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/31/17799094/california-100- 
percent-clean-energy-target-brown-de-leon.
have a goal or a strategy for eliminating fossil fuels from 
its transportation or heating sectors. Several local govern-
ments, happily, have made commitments to decarbonize 
all aspects of their energy systems.167 But, thus far, they do 
not have strategies to meet their commitments. In short, we 
lack both goals and designs for effective decarbonization.
We must change this approach. The United States and 
the rest of the world must quickly establish and achieve 
end goals for climate mitigation. Climate scientists have 
already told us what these end goals must be: for the world 
to have a chance of keeping temperature increases to toler-
able levels, we must decarbonize our energy systems and, 
ultimately, achieve net-negative emissions targets through 
carbon sequestration.168 Global greenhouse gas emissions 
must stop increasing, immediately, and they must then 
rapidly drop, so that, by 2050, developed countries emit 
no greenhouse gases from fossil fuels.
U.S. lawmakers at the local, state, and federal (after the 
Trump Administration is out of office) levels must commit 
to complete energy decarbonization by 2050.169 They then 
must design their decarbonization strategies to ensure they 
meet this ambitious target. Much like we expect architects 
to design buildings that will perform as expected, we need 
to expect our lawmakers and regulatory agencies to cre-
ate decarbonization strategies that will achieve the goals. 
Rather than apply existing laws with the hope that they 
will eventually reduce emissions over time, we need to cre-
ate legal systems that ensure success. If “every system is 
perfectly designed to get the results it gets,” it is past time 
for the United States to adopt a design approach to decar-
bonization. We cannot afford to get it wrong.
XII. Preparing Environmental Law for the 
Climate Dystopia
This section was authored by J.B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen 
Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Program on Law and 
Innovation, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and 
Land Use Program, Vanderbilt Law School.
The probability of holding the climb in atmospheric tem-
perature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, the central 
goal of the Paris Agreement,170 is rapidly approaching 
zero.171 Barring a global political miracle, technological 
breakthrough, or economic collapse, we will surpass 2°C 
167. Sierra Club, 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties & States, https://www.
sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
168. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C: Headline Statements (2018), 
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_headline_statements.pdf.
169. See Nancy Bazilchuk, It’s Important to Have a Goal: UN Climate Re-
port View From the Nordics, ScienceNordic, Oct. 15, 2018 (discuss-
ing the importance of ambitious targets), http://sciencenordic.com/
its-important-have-goal-un-climate-report-view-nordics.
170. See Yun Gao et al., The 2°C Global Temperature Target and the Evolution of 
the Long-Term Goal of Addressing Climate Change—From the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement, 3 Engi-
neering 272, 272 (2017).
171. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, Here’s How Far the World Is From Meet-
ing Its Climate Goals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/06/climate/world-emissions-goals-far-off-course.html.
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and enter an era of climate dystopia.172 How long that 
lasts before, if ever, we turn the corner is anyone’s guess. 
Among the many casualties will be environmental law as 
we know it.
I paint a bleak picture, but it is one our nation’s insti-
tutions of environmental law must face. Vast expanses of 
human populations will demand their well-being be pro-
tected from storms, droughts, pests, diseases, and other 
intense harms that extreme climate change will bring their 
way. The built environment will be reinforced or moved. 
Agricultural lands will be retooled or relocated. Halting 
the spread of crop pests will be a priority. Malaria, den-
gue fever, and other diseases will be controlled at all costs. 
Water will be moved to where it desperately is needed. Peo-
ple living where relief is simply unattainable will be relo-
cated or leave of their own accord.
Equitable distribution of these and other protective 
measures will be demanded. And if environmental pro-
grams such as NEPA, the ESA, §404 of the CWA, the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 
and their many kin stand in the way of these adaptive 
responses, they will be mowed down. To be blunt about it: 
environmental law must prepare for the climate dystopia or 
be pushed aside.
The prospect of a climate dystopia means environmen-
tal law must put its money where its mouth is. For more 
than a decade, advocates for swift and robust controls on 
greenhouse gas emissions argued—rightly so—that failure 
to implement such controls would lead to a drastic global 
scenario of massive disruption to social-ecological systems. 
With failure increasingly likely, it would be untenable to 
suggest that the scenario is less dire than claimed or that 
adaptation measures of unprecedented scale and magni-
tude will not be necessary. Rather, climate change “miti-
gationists” must now work alongside “adaptationists,” and 
environmental law will need to conform to both agendas.
To be clear, I am not for a moment suggesting that envi-
ronmental law back off efforts to control greenhouse gas 
emissions—even as we pass 2°C, we must continue work to 
turn it around (although a separate issue is whether hard-
line environmentalism’s opposition to new gas pipelines 
and electric transmission lines is actually impeding mitiga-
tion173). Rather, it is climate change adaptation, not mitiga-
tion, that will push back on environmental law as we know 
it. Yet, as much as environmental law must pursue “deep 
decarbonization,” it also must facilitate “deep adaptation.”
This will be a new kind of challenge for environmental 
law. For the most part, the controversies enveloping envi-
ronmental law until now have mostly been about an “envi-
ronment versus economy” rhetoric.174 Environmental law 
172. See generally IPCC, supra note 46.
173. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Pipeline Opposition Impedes Climate Change Mitiga-
tion, Reg. Rev., Sept. 13, 2018, https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/13/
pipeline-opposition-impedes-climate-change-mitigation/.
174. Ian Carey, The Great Economy Versus Environment Myth, Huffpost, June 
5, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-carey/the-great-economy-
versus-_b_1398439.html.
has long been cast by critics as the enemy of jobs175 and 
the enemy of property rights,176 but rarely has it been con-
demned, even by its most ardent opponents, as the enemy 
of public health and safety (a recent example, though, is 
President Trump’s preposterous claim that water conser-
vation initiatives had prevented firefighters from accessing 
water to combat California’s raging wildfires177). That will 
change in the era of climate change adaptation, if environ-
mental law does not itself adapt.
Before considering what can be done to prepare envi-
ronmental law for the climate dystopia, let us consider and 
dispense with the option of staying the course, fighting the 
fight, and not giving an inch. This strikes me as a suicidal 
strategy. People whose health, safety, and security depend 
on rapid and robust adaptation measures—shoring up 
coastal barriers, eradicating disease-bearing insects, con-
trolling floods, protecting crops from new migrating pests, 
and securing drinking water supplies—will have sharply 
diminished tolerance for protracted NEPA litigation, for 
avoiding all impacts to endangered species, for staying out 
of wetlands, for conserving water supplies, and for other 
environmental protection and conservation measures 
taken as a given today.
Giving no ground by behaving as if the climate adapta-
tion demand for new infrastructure is like today’s highway 
project, or as if the demand for deploying new pesticides is 
like today’s FIFRA registration challenge, or as if the need 
to clear habitat for new agricultural land development or 
new infrastructure is like today’s endangered species con-
flict, will be a sorely misguided strategy. This is not to say 
environmental law must simply go away, but taking a hard-
line position of enforcing all existing environmental laws 
to the hilt will ignite a furious backlash that could open the 
door to a wholesale rollback of regulatory programs, and 
with broad and deep public support for doing so.
So the more realistic question to ask is, what can envi-
ronmental law do now to become more facilitative of cli-
mate change adaptation without sacrificing core values 
and goals? We do not want to throw the baby out with 
the bathwater. Several strategies seem viable and capable 
of being implemented under existing laws. The following 
descriptions of their core approaches use federal law as the 
medium for explanation, but they could be instituted at 
state and local levels as well.
175. Thomas J. Pyle, Environmentalists’ Worst Enemy May Be Their Own Poli-
cies, Forbes, Aug. 11, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/ 
08/11/environmentalists-worst-enemy-may-be-their-own-policies/#701 
bbae3a61d.
176. Roger Pilon, Property Rights and Environmental Protection, Cato Inst., 
June 27, 1995, https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/
property-rights-environmental-protection.
177. John D. Sutter, Trump’s “Ridiculous” Tweet About California Wildfires, 
CNN, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/health/trump-
tweet-california-wildfire-water-invs/index.html.
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A. Maximize Connections to Public Health 
and Safety
Although some corners of environmental law are closely 
tied to promoting public health, such as air pollution regu-
lations, that connection has not often been drawn to nat-
ural resources programs such as the ESA and §404, and 
protecting public safety has generally not been a theme of 
environmental law. More could be done on this front. The 
ecosystem services theme that has gained prominence in 
the past two decades is aimed in this direction.178
For example, wetlands provide water purification and 
groundwater recharge services as well as protection against 
inland flooding and coastal storm surges. Wherever it can 
be shown that robust protection of natural resources pro-
motes climate change adaptation strategies, those connec-
tions should be made and widely advertised. This will only 
go so far, however, as those connections must be shown to 
be real and credibly assessed.
B. Establish Criteria for What Qualifies as a 
Climate Change Adaptation Action
Clearly, not every action and project should be considered 
as furthering climate change adaptation, hence it will be 
important to establish a set of criteria for designating a proj-
ect as truly serving necessary and urgent climate change 
adaptation and thus qualifying for the approaches outlined 
below. A multiagency commission could be charged with 
evaluating which projects qualify. This could very likely 
be instituted by a presidential Executive Order establishing 
the commission, outlining the goals, and directing execu-
tive agencies to use existing authorities to achieve them.
C. Embrace Compensatory Mitigation
Although compensatory mitigation already is deeply 
embedded in many programs, most prominently in §404 
wetlands mitigation banking,179 it needs to be expanded, 
simplified, and made widely available. Climate adapta-
tion, especially shoring up or relocating built environment 
infrastructure, is going to have extensive impacts on natu-
ral resources, and holding to the strategies of avoid and 
minimize preferred in today’s environmental programs 
will be problematic.
Also, the Obama Administration’s stated goal of hav-
ing compensatory mitigation produce net environmental 
benefits, even when not required by law (it seldom is),180 
178. The Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, http://
www.teebweb.org/resources/ecosystem-services/ (last visited Nov. 26, 
2018).
179. U.S. EPA, Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation Fact Sheet, https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/compensatory_
mitigation_factsheet.pdf.
180. Presidential Memorandum: Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources From 
Development and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 80 Fed. Reg. 
68743 (Nov. 6, 2015), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2015/11/03/mitigating-impacts-natural-resources-develop-
ment-and-encouraging-related.
which the Trump Administration rescinded,181 would be 
a magnet for opposition. Something closer to the ESA’s 
“maximum extent practicable” standard for qualifying 
actions, which does not require full compensation (much 
less net benefits) could be workable.182 Section 404 of the 
CWA itself imposes no standard; indeed, it does not men-
tion mitigation183—Congress required the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to establish “performance 
standards” for mitigation in a 2004 military appropriations 
bill, but they also imposed no outcome standard.184 It may 
also be necessary to allow compensatory mitigation after 
the fact, so as to expedite necessary projects.
D. Expedite Processes
Speaking of which, there already is a fierce debate over 
whether predecision impact assessment processes such as 
NEPA, ESA §7, and FIFRA registration take too long to 
complete and are too costly. That debate will only intensify 
as important adaptation measures are at stake. But manda-
tory page limits and time limits are not needed across the 
board, as the Trump Administration is seeking.185 Rather, 
qualifying climate adaptation projects could be moved to 
an alternative consolidated impact assessment “fast track” 
under which one document would serve all such review 
programs, only “no action” and “proposed action” would be 
considered as the alternatives, and mandatory time frames 
would be in effect. Nothing in NEPA, §7 of the ESA, or 
§404 of the CWA precludes such an approach for land 
development projects. The respective agencies (Council on 
Environmental Quality, EPA, and the Corps) could there-
fore promulgate regulations establishing this approach.
E. Leverage Statutory Substantive Flexibility
Many of our current environmental laws actually are 
sufficiently flexible to allow regulators to scale back on 
controls and conditions where appropriate to facilitate 
important climate adaptation initiatives. For example, 
§404(b)(1) of the CWA, which authorizes EPA to promul-
gate water degradation guidelines for the Corps’ issuance 
of §404 permits, does not establish any fixed standards 
or limits.186 By cross-reference to §403(c),187 it simply lists 
the types of effects the guidelines must address. And EPA 
is authorized in §404(c) to veto a Corps permit only if it 
will result in an “unacceptable adverse effect” on any of 
several specified resources.188
181. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
182. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
183. 33 U.S.C. §1344.
184. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
136, §314, 117 Stat. 1392, 1393 (2003).
185. Fact Sheet, The White House, President Donald J. Trump’s Administration 
Is Improving Inefficient Permitting Reviews (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-adminis-
tration-improving-inefficient-permitting-reviews/.
186. 33 U.S.C. §1344(b)(1).
187. Id. §1343(c).
188. Id. §1344(c).
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Similarly, FIFRA pesticide registration is held to a stan-
dard of not imposing “unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment,” defined to require a cost-benefit analysis.189 
EPA very likely would have the authority to carve out qual-
ifying climate change adaptation infrastructure projects 
and pesticide registrations for a specialized set of guidelines 
as to what are “unacceptable” and “unreasonable” envi-
ronmental impacts. Even the ESA, often depicted as rigid 
and demanding, has room for flexing on behalf of climate 
adaptation projects. For example, given that it operates on 
a species-wide assessment scale, very few projects today 
result in the dreaded “jeopardy” finding under the inter-
agency consultation provision of §7,190 and the §10 permit-
ting process for nonfederal actions leaves ample room for 
using compensatory mitigation flexibly.191
F. Institute “Repair Accounts” and “Repair Planning” 
to Offset Relaxed Standards
The quid pro quo for all of the above could be to keep track 
of impacts that were not avoided, minimized, or mitigated 
because of the above measures, and put them in a “repair 
account” tagged to the entities carrying out the project. A 
condition of the permits covering the project could be to 
develop a “repair plan” that would require fixing or com-
pensating for those impacts in the future when it makes 
sense to do so. For example, repair efforts might not be 
prudent while temperatures are past 2°C and still rising.
G. Conclusion
These and similar measures within reach under exist-
ing environmental laws may not provide enough “flex” 
to accommodate needed adaptation initiatives, in which 
case the statutory can of worms might need to be opened 
up. That prospect could be ugly for environmental law. It 
behooves those interested in keeping environmental pro-
tection and conservation in play for adaptation policy, 
therefore, to find creative ways of molding today’s environ-
mental programs to meet tomorrow’s climate adaptation 
needs while maintaining as much of the core goals in place 
as possible.
I appreciate that this sounds like a call for compromise—
because it is—and that environmentalists have long been 
wary of compromises, likening them to sleeping with the 
enemy. But when it comes to climate change adaptation, 
refusing to compromise is a fool’s errand. The challenge 
will be in designing compromises that allow important cli-
mate change adaptation measures to go forward without 
imposing unnecessary adverse environmental impacts and 
without opening the door too wide to what qualifies for 
more flexible treatment. The sooner environmental insti-
tutions begin thinking about this challenge and crafting 
approaches like those described above, the sooner they will 
189. 7 U.S.C. §136(bb).
190. 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2).
191. Id. §1539(a)(2).
be perceived as a friend of adaptation asking only for rea-
sonable environmental safeguards.
XIII. Memo to Environmentalists: 
Brace for Problems of Preemption, 
Property Rights, and Political Scale
This section was authored by Erin Ryan, Elizabeth C. & 
Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State University 
College of Law.
It is a daunting moment for environmentalists. Each day, 
it appears federal environmental law is being systematically 
dismantled, most aggressively by the executive branch,192 
but with tacit support from the sitting legislature, and—
with record numbers of President Trump’s judicial nomi-
nees sailing through the appointments process193—likely 
soon with increasing support from the judiciary. Environ-
mental advocates are grieving these losses, but we must also 
brace for new hurdles—and, in particular, the “Three Ps”: 
preemption, property rights, and political scale.
First, we must ensure that the campaign to dismantle 
federal environmental law does not spill over into displac-
ing state and local efforts to fill the void. Then, we must 
push back against the strategic deployment of property 
rights to block future efforts to reinvigorate federal envi-
ronmental law. Finally, we must think creatively about how 
to accomplish the goals of national-level environmental 
policy without the benefit of federal authority. This essay, a 
memo to environmentalists at this pivotal moment in time, 
reviews each of these challenges in turn.
A. Preemption
Preemption refers to the ability of a higher level of gov-
ernment to override contrary decisions made by a lower 
level of government. It matters a lot in environmental 
law, where important roles are played by federal, state, 
and local decisionmakers. Federal environmental statutes 
often partner national and local regulators in distinct but 
interlocking roles within larger programs of cooperative 
federalism—in which the feds usually set standards and 
oversee compliance, while state and local actors decide 
how best to implement standards for local circumstanc-
es.194 These laws usually follow the model of “floor pre-
emption,” establishing a federal “floor” of mandatory 
regulation that states may not fall below, but one that 
allows them to set more stringent regulations to address 
local concerns and preferences.195
192. Popovich et al., supra note 141.
193. Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many Federal Ap-
peals Judges as Obama in His First Year, Time, Dec. 15, 2017, http://time.
com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/.
194. Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in The Law and 
Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis 355 
(Kalyani Robbins ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
195. See William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547 (2007).
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Federal environmental laws do not usually prevent 
states from exceeding the federal floor, but there are excep-
tions—for example, automobile emissions standards. EPA 
has primary authority to set these standards, and states 
are generally forbidden from both raising and lowering 
them.196 Even so, §209 of the CAA authorizes California to 
set more stringent standards in light of its unique regional 
challenges197—and under §177, other states may elect Cali-
fornia’s stricter standard in lieu of the EPA “ceiling.”198 The 
interplay between state and federal standard-setting under 
the “California waiver”199 blunts the force of this example 
of “ceiling preemption,”200 which is generally rare in U.S. 
environmental law. But with mounting hostility to envi-
ronmental regulation, that could change.
Which brings us to the first challenge that environ-
mental advocates will likely face: the increasing threat of 
anti-environmental federal preemption. Proponents of 
deregulation seem poised to roll back many federal stan-
dards, but thanks to our dynamic model of environmental 
federalism, that is not enough to accomplish their goal. 
State and local leaders are already hard at work resusci-
tating environmental governance initiatives abandoned by 
the federal government. For example, the United States 
Climate Alliance is a coalition of 17 states and territories 
committed to upholding the objectives of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement within their borders, formed the very day Presi-
dent Trump withdrew the United States from the accord.201 
(Indeed, I have never been more grateful for American fed-
eralism than I am right now.)
For deregulation interests to fully succeed, then, they 
must prevent state and local governments from simply 
taking up the vacated federal seat at the regulatory table. 
For that reason, “Team Deregulation” is unlikely to sim-
ply withdraw the federal government from the regulatory 
field entirely, which would swing open the door to state law 
making. Instead, they are likely to seek weaker regulations 
partnered with language expressly preempting contrary 
state or local rules. If they cannot muster the political capi-
tal to get express preemption into the text, then they will 
attempt to persuade a reviewing court to imply it.
To wit, the Trump Administration is already trying to 
get rid of the CAA’s California waiver.202 Since the Admin-
istration is trying to roll back the Obama-era rule increas-
ing emission standards to 54 miles per gallon (mpg) by 
196. Clean Air Act, tit. II, Emissions Standards for Moving Sources, Pub. L. No. 
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.).
197. 42 U.S.C. §7543.
198. Id. §7507.
199. U.S. EPA, Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, https://
www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-
waivers-and-authorizations (last updated June 23, 2017).
200. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1097 (2009).
201. U.S. Climate Alliance, Home Page, https://www.usclimatealliance.org (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2018).
202. Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and California, 
Atlantic, Mar. 6, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/ 
2017/03/trump-california-clean-air-act-waiver-climate-change/518649/.
2025,203 this is the next logical step—otherwise, the states 
could simply ignore EPA’s looser rules and follow Cali-
fornia’s more stringent alternative. That is why the same 
rollback of the 54-mpg standard also eliminates Califor-
nia’s ability to keep it.204 It is critical that environmentalists 
preserve the ability of states to continue moving forward 
on emissions controls, even as the federal government 
attempts to take us backward.
With all this in mind, environmental advocates must 
identify and fortify those realms of federal environmen-
tal law most vulnerable to ceiling preemption after federal 
regulations are weakened. We must ensure that neither 
Congress nor EPA pairs federal deregulatory efforts with 
statutory or regulatory language field-preempting subna-
tional interference. And we will need to think carefully 
about other ways to safeguard the environment—which 
brings us to the next P.
B. Property Rights
Even as we respond to the current assault on federal envi-
ronmental law, we also need to think ahead. Deregulation 
interests know that even if they succeed in dismantling 
those laws today, that will not be enough, since a shift in 
national leadership could always bring them back in the 
future. So, here is a riddle: what is the best way to prevent 
that from happening?
Public law norms generally prevent governmental deci-
sionmakers from binding their future counterparts, so 
legal rules enacted today can ordinarily be revisited in the 
future. But that is not always the end of the issue, thanks 
to another of Team Deregulation’s favorite strategies. The 
answer to the riddle: fortify the nonregulatory status quo 
with property rights.
Private property rights are a democratic foundation—a 
bulwark of protection for individuals against power—but 
they can be manipulated in contexts where public and pri-
vate rights overlap, as they so often do in environmental 
law. Here in the United States, few legal concerns com-
mand more focused constitutional attention than threats 
to private property. They receive the full force and atten-
tion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Takings 
Clauses, which require compensation when the govern-
ment “takes” property for public use.205 The definition of 
“take” continues to evolve, however, and these clauses are 
sometimes interpreted to require compensation for any 
public regulation that interferes with private economic use 
of property, even when that use is harming the public.206 
Moreover, private claims often fail to account for counter-
203. Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama Emis-
sion Standards, Hill, Aug. 2, 2018, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/400036-trump-submits-rule-to-weaken-iconic-obama-car-
efficiency-standards.
204. Id.
205. Legal Information Institute, Takings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tak-
ings (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
206. Bill Funk, CPR Perspective: The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Cen-
ter for Progressive Reform, http://www.progressivereform.org/persp-
Takings.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
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vailing public property rights in related public commons 
natural resources.
The “takings-ification” of American property law has 
been gathering force over time, and today, nothing can take 
down an environmental regulation more efficiently than 
the claim that it constitutes a taking. Which is why, from 
the perspective of Team Deregulation, it is such a winning 
strategy. Rather than just dismantling environmental reg-
ulations that prevent extraction from public lands, much 
better to issue as many oil and gas leases on these newly 
opened public lands as possible.207 Those leases do not just 
yield an extractive win for industry in the present, they 
will complicate efforts to dial extraction back in the future, 
because private extractive rights will then have a thick layer 
of constitutional protection. Prof. Christopher Serkin has 
persuasively shown how government actors have learned to 
consolidate their power in the present, protecting it from 
changed policy preferences in the future, by making pre-
commitments into the future through the private law tools 
of property and contract.208
Environmentalists must push back against the stra-
tegic use of property rights to fortify the deregulatory 
agenda. They must scrutinize efforts to create or reify 
private entitlements that would entrench environmental 
deregulation by preventing more stringent scrutiny in 
the future. They must also better educate lawmakers and 
judges about the complex relationships within property 
and environmental law, to refute the misguided takings-
ification that occurs when we fail to account for the over-
lapping public and private interests in natural resources. 
As federal law often borrows from state-law concepts of 
property, we can never ignore the importance of continu-
ing to develop the common law of property through liti-
gation in state courts. Which brings us, incidentally, to 
the third and final P challenge.
C. Political Scale
With federal environmental law under sustained attack, it 
becomes incumbent on us to think more seriously about 
how to continue pursuing solutions to national-level envi-
ronmental problems by means other than federal authority. 
More than ever, we are facing interjurisdictional challenges 
that cannot be managed effectively in a piecemeal man-
ner.209 Some 50 years ago, we conceded that problems like 
air and water pollution, species loss, and climate change 
went beyond any single state’s boundaries, or capacity.210 
After the failure of the patchwork-of-states approach, 
207. Darryl Fears, Trump Administration Tears Down Regulations to Speed Drilling 
on Public Land, Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2018/02/01/trump-administration-tears- 
down-regulations-to-speed-drilling-on-public-land.
208. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Lo-
cal Governments, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879, 894-95 (2011).
209. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balances in the Interjurisdictional Grey Area, 66 Md. L. Rev. 503, 567-84 
(2007). See also Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within 
145-59 (2012).
210. Id.
iconic federal laws like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts 
recognized the importance of centralized national author-
ity to cope with these problems.211
But what if national authority ends? Disheartening as 
it may be, we need to think about new strategies for large-
scale environmental governance that do not rely on federal 
law. We should keep fighting to get federal law back—but 
in the meantime, the environment cannot wait.
The clearest alternative is regional governance. The 
patchwork approach was ineffective and challenging for 
industry, but what if many states used the same law? Per-
haps we should consider the development of uniform state 
laws or model codes that would enable states to coordi-
nate on a broader regulatory scale. Successful examples 
like the Uniform Commercial Code,212 the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct,213 and other widely adopted laws 
provide a deliberated, tested model for states seeking 
sound, consensus-based policies in complex realms of law. 
States could adopt them in the wake of withdrawn federal 
law or for wholly new areas, addressing climate change, 
water pollution, and waste management. For example, 
universities nationwide are collaborating on the multidis-
ciplinary development of the Sustainable Development 
Code to provide best sustainability practices for adoption 
by local governments.214
Uniform laws provide an obvious model for coordinated 
but nonfederal national response, but we might even con-
sider less conventional means. Legal pluralism heralds the 
possibility of multiple sources of simultaneous normative 
policymaking, including sources beyond sovereign-based 
law.215 Could private or nongovernmental rules contribute 
to large-scale environmental action? Perhaps there could 
be meaningful guidance or rulemaking by commercial 
associations like the American Arbitration Association, 
professional associations like the American Law Institute, 
nongovernmental legal institutions like the Council of 
Mayors, religious organizations, trade organizations, uni-
versities, and others?
In fact, here is a concrete example that puts some of these 
ideas together. We all know that climate is the largest-scale 
environmental problem of all, ideally calling not only for 
national but international policymaking. Yet a substan-
tial volume of climate-relevant decisionmaking occurs 
within individual homes and neighborhoods.216 And in the 
United States, a large volume amount of that decisionmak-
ing takes place through private homeowner associations 
(HOAs). One in five Americans live in property subject to 
211. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. 
Rev. 1183, 1191 (1995).
212. See generally U.C.C. (1977).
213. Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct (1983).
214. News Release, Drake University, Drake Law School Forms Partnership 
to Update Sustainable Community Development Code (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://news.drake.edu/2017/02/01/drake-law-school-forms-partnership-
to-update-sustainable-community-development-code/.
215. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155 (2007).
216. Courtney St. John, Changing Household Behavior to Reduce Carbon Emis-
sions, St. Planet, Jan. 10, 2013, https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2013/01/10/
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HOA governance,217 but many are operating without suf-
ficient legal expertise or guidance. Recognizing that prob-
lem, many states enact statutes,218 municipalities provide 
guidance,219 and private organizations sponsor training 
materials220 for HOA board members, to help them make 
better decisions that strengthen their communities.
So, what if we could impact climate policy by harnessing 
the private law influence of HOA decisionmaking on cli-
mate-relevant matters? Borrowing, perhaps, from parts of 
the Sustainable Development Code already in progress,221 
legal architects could draft a model code of HOA best 
practices on water conservation, renewable energy use, 
217. Ernie Smith, Study: Homeowners Associations Hit New Population Peaks, 
Ass’ns Now, May 15, 2015, https://associationsnow.com/2015/05/study- 
homeowners-associations-hit-new-population-peaks/.
218. Fla. Stat. §720 (2018).
219. Henrico County, Virginia, Homeowners’ Associations, https://henrico.us/ 
revit/hoas/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
220. Homeowner Associations USA, A Guide for Homeowner Associa-
tion Board Members (2010).
221. Drake University, Draft Climate Chapter, Sustainable Com-
munity Development Code, https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 
1TolghETH_nuaOCZmz9ck9PFYCJOS-lrb/view.
transportation considerations, and other issues that impact 
the nation’s climate footprint. A model code could also dis-
courage HOAs from preventing solar panels, clotheslines, 
rain barrels, or other sustainable practices, and they could 
encourage landscaping practices that limit pesticide and 
nutrient loading of waterways.
In the end, overcoming the Three Ps will require novel 
ideas—but we will need some ambitious thinking to move 
forward in the difficult days to come. After all, necessity is 
the mother of creativity—and has there ever been greater 
need than right now?
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